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ABSTRACT 
When can the government keep its illegal action secret? In spite of the 
strong incentive for government officials and institutions to hide unlawful 
conduct from the public and their demonstrated tendency to do so, both 
public information access doctrines and the broader normative discussion 
of government secrecy inadequately answer this question. The 
questionable legality and pervasive secrecy of recent national security 
activities—in particular, the National Security Agency’s (“NSA’s”) 
collection of millions of Americans’ phone records, the government’s 
unilateral and self-serving decision to characterize illegal conduct like 
torture as an “intelligence method” protected from public disclosure, and 
the government’s position that it can secretly kill suspected terrorists 
through unmanned drone strikes abroad without public oversight of the 
claimed legal authority to do so—underscore the extent to which 
democratic accountability is undermined when government secrecy and 
the prospect of illegality converge. This Article examines when the 
illegality (as well as the possible illegality) of executive action should 
preclude government attempts to keep its conduct secret. Or, to put it 
simply, it examines when a government secret becomes an illegal secret. 
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In addressing the under-theorized relationship between secrecy and 
illegality with respect to government information control, this Article also 
examines the insufficiently acknowledged problem of shallow secrets that 
conceal illegal or potentially illegal government conduct. In recent years, 
the problem of illegal secrets has surfaced with increasing frequency and 
urgency. In a variety of Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) cases, 
when members of the public have sought information about controversial 
and legally suspect government policies and programs courts have largely 
deferred to the Executive’s claims that it is entitled to withhold 
information irrespective of whether the activities at issue violate the law. 
Indeed, numerous courts have expressly held that government illegality is 
irrelevant when evaluating the appropriateness of government secrecy 
decisions. Examining this troubling trend, this Article argues that the 
legality of secret government conduct is a vital consideration that must be 
prominent in an information disclosure regime premised upon the goal of 
democratic accountability. It therefore proposes that the established 
illegality of the underlying conduct sought to be exposed is a powerful 
basis for compelling disclosure of government information. Only in the 
most pressing and exceptional cases should executive claims of a national 
security priority present a paramount justification for withholding 
information from the public. This Article further posits that where there is 
a plausible allegation of illegality, courts must consider whether 
sanctioning government secrecy will thwart public debate regarding the 
lawfulness of the conduct concealed, such that the more plausible the 
allegation of illegality, the stronger the basis for disclosure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Government secrecy and the abuse of power have long shared a 
symbiotic relationship. Too often, government secrecy enables legally 
questionable government action.
1
 And when government actors violate the 
law, they reflexively embrace secrecy as a means of shielding their actions 
from public scrutiny and legal responsibility.
2
 Some forms of official 
abuse, most notably torture, depend upon secrecy and inflict more 
suffering because of it.
3
  
 
 
 1. PUB. INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BD., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: TRANSFORMING THE 
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 6 (2012), http://www.archives.gov/declassification/pidb/ 
recommendations/transforming-classification.pdf (government secrecy “at worst . . . enables corruption 
and malfeasance”). 
 2. See SISSELLA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 25–26 
(1982); Gerald Wetlaufer, Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General Deliberative Privilege, 65 
IND. L.J. 845, 886 n.162 (1990); See also Arthur Schlesinger, Preface to DAVID BANISAR, 
GOVERNMENT SECRECY: DECISIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY 13 (2007).  
 3. Lisa Hajjar, Sovereign Bodies, Sovereign States and the Problem of Torture, in QUEST: AN 
AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, XVI, No. 1–2, at 108, 118 (2002); Aditi Bagchi, Intention, 
Torture, and the Concept of State Crime, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 42–43 (2009) (“Secrecy also denies 
the obligation to justify the exercise of power on individuals, it denies the legitimate interest of the 
political community in what happens to the torture victim, and in this cruelty it alienates and 
dehumanizes her.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Indeed, as a global and historical phenomenon, when governments 
commit grave human rights violations or engage in other serious abuses of 
power, secrecy invariably provides space for such crimes to occur, and for 
victims silenced or denied public acknowledgment of their injury, secrecy 
necessarily serves as an additional tool of oppression.
4
 Throughout U.S. 
history, secrecy has at times played a similarly nefarious role, shielding 
from public scrutiny controversial government policies, elected officials’ 
embarrassing mistakes, and perhaps most significantly, illegal government 
action.
5 
 
In recent years, the question of whether the government should be 
entitled to keep its illegal action secret has emerged frequently in the 
context of national security policy. In the pattern now routinely followed 
in today’s secrecy regime, the government regularly cloaks in secrecy the 
purported authorization for some of the most contentious and legally 
questionable policies of our time, including the treatment of detainees and 
interrogation policy, the targeted killing of suspected terrorists abroad, and 
most recently, the NSA’s massive, warrantless electronic surveillance of 
millions of Americans.
6
 The government also regularly withholds details 
regarding implementation of such policies, including information related 
 
 
 4. See generally STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND 
SUFFERING (2001). 
 5. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1998); 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK II OF THE FINAL REPORT OF 
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP. NO. 94-755, pt. 2, at 292 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE 
REPORT], available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs94th/94755_II.pdf (concluding that 
“excessive secrecy” had long been used by government to “shield the existence of constitutional, legal, 
and moral problems”). 
 6. In June 2013, the Guardian newspaper and Washington Post, based upon leaks of classified 
information by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, revealed a secret NSA surveillance program 
through which the agency collects bulk telephony metadata from millions of Americans. See The NSA 
Files, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/the-nsa-files [hereinafter The 
NSA Files]. An aspect of the NSA’s secret warrantless electronic surveillance program was first 
revealed to the public in 2005. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers 
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. But the Snowden revelations revealed the scope of 
the NSA’s bulk data collection, and a host of other domestic surveillance activities, prompting 
renewed questions about the program’s legality. For a synopsis of the surveillance program and 
opposing conclusions about its legality, see Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851, 2013 WL 6571596 
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013) (enjoining the NSA’s warrantless collection of bulk telephone metadata after 
finding that it likely violates the Fourth Amendment); ACLU v. Clapper, no. 13 Civ. 3994, 2013 WL 
6819708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013) (upholding the constitutionality of the NSA program after 
noting “[t]his blunt tool only works because it collects everything.”). Since the first Guardian story, a 
stream of disclosures regarding other secret NSA surveillance programs followed and at the time of 
this writing continue to emerge, including revelations about the NSA spying on foreign leaders and 
disclosures about Prism, a secret surveillance program through which the government accesses 
information about users directly from the servers of major technology companies. See The NSA Files.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/5
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to their efficacy and human costs. And irrespective of the legality of the 
government conduct concealed, courts have repeatedly turned back claims 
by members of the public seeking information about these activities and 
the policies informing them.
7 
 
Specifically, courts have allowed the government to keep secret 
documents regarding the CIA’s use of waterboarding8—a technique long 
and widely considered to constitute unlawful torture,
9
 and which the 
United States has previously prosecuted as a crime in domestic courts and 
military tribunals.
10
 Courts have sanctioned the secrecy of the 
government’s purported authority for killing suspected terrorists through 
drone strikes abroad,
11
 even where the legality of such actions remains a 
hotly contested legal question.
12
 Courts have also declared the legality of 
President Bush’s warrantless electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens in 
contravention of the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (“FISA”)13 irrelevant to whether documents regarding the program 
should be disclosed to the public.
14
 And more than a year before Edward 
Snowden leaked classified information regarding the massive scope of the 
NSA’s warrantless surveillance program purportedly authorized by 
Section 215 of the Patriot Act, a district court ruled that the alleged bad 
faith of the government in misleading Congress about the scope of 
surveillance authorized by that law was irrelevant to whether the 
government could keep its legal interpretation secret.
15
  
 
 
 7.  See infra text accompanying notes 10, 13, and 14. 
 8. See, e.g., ACLU v. DOJ, 681 F.3d 61, 73–75 (2d Cir. 2012) (allowing the CIA to keep secret 
documents relating to the use of waterboarding on terrorism suspects abroad on grounds that 
waterboarding constituted an “intelligence method” protected from disclosure under FOIA irrespective 
of its legality). 
 9. Daniel Kanstroom, On “Waterboarding”: Legal Interpretation and the Continuing Struggle 
for Human Rights, 32 B.C. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 203, 204 (2009) (“[T]he practice is one of the 
oldest and most widely recognized forms of torture.”). 
 10. See Evan Wallach, Drop By Drop: Forgetting The History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 
45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468, 472 (2007). 
 11. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. DOJ, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); ACLU v. DOJ, 808 F. 
Supp. 2d 280 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 12. COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC & CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, THE 
CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS (2012) [hereinafter 
CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES], available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/human-rights-institute/ 
counterterrorism/drone-strikes/civilian-impact-drone-strikes-unexamined-costs-unanswered-questions 
(describing numerous ways secrecy surrounding U.S. targeted killing policy hinders assessment of the 
program’s legality, efficacy, and impact on civilians).  
 13. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §§ 102–03, 92 Stat. 1783, 1786–
88 (to be codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801). 
 14. See, e.g., Wilner v. NSA, 592 F.3d 60, 77 (2d Cir. 2009); People for the Am. Way v. NSA, 
462 F. Supp. 2d 21, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 15. See N.Y. Times v. DOJ, 872 F. Supp. 2d 309, 317–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); The Patriot Act, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Thus, under prevailing law governing public access to government 
information, a remarkable principle is clear: our legal system is no more 
suspicious or demanding of government secrecy when it conceals patently 
unlawful conduct or potentially illegal government conduct than when 
secrecy conceals the legitimate workings of government. Indeed, courts 
have effectively declared disputes about the secrecy surrounding 
controversial and potentially illegal national security policies non-
justiciable.
16
  
This judicial deference to executive secrecy without regard to the 
lawfulness of the government’s actions is cause for concern given that the 
ability to both conceal and enable government wrongdoing is secrecy’s 
most illegitimate yet seductive feature. Given the symbiotic and historic 
relationship between secrecy and illegality, this Article argues that 
concerns about government illegality ought to play a greater role in the 
law regulating state secrecy. Some scholars have begun to recognize that 
the law should be more skeptical of government secrecy when it conceals 
potential illegality, but have not described at length why that is the case or 
how—under FOIA’s existing disclosure framework or in other contexts 
like the state secrets privilege—the law should respond to the problem.17  
This Article addresses this under-theorized relationship between 
secrecy and illegality with respect to government information control. It 
aims to identify when concerns about the legality of executive action 
should preclude government attempts to keep its conduct secret. Or, to put 
it simply, it examines when a government secret becomes an illegal 
secret.
18
  
 
 
§ 215(a)(1), 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a)(1) (2010). 
 16. See Ben Wizner, Dir. of the Speech, Privacy & Tech. Project at the ACLU, Fordham Law 
Sch., Ctr. on Nat’l Sec., Comments at Government, Secrecy, and National Security Symposium (Oct. 
16, 2012) (notes on file with author) (invoking the concept of “non-justiciability” to describe judicial 
treatment of national security FOIA cases). 
 17. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Secrecy and Self-Governance, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 91 (2011–
12) (“[T]he government has no legitimate interest in keeping secret its own illegality, and the public 
has a compelling interest in the disclosure of such information. . . . In a self-governing society, citizens 
need to know when their representatives violate the law.”); Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the 
Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1314 (2007) (arguing that 
although the state secrets privilege may appropriately strike a balance in favor of national security, in 
many contexts “where the legality of government conduct is itself at issue, it may be appropriate to 
explore other solutions to the secrecy dilemma”); Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive 
Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom of Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access 
to Government Information, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 690, 731 (1984) (“The only circumstances in which 
a court would be constitutionally justified in examining particular secrets and order their disclosure are 
those in which reasonable grounds exist to believe that the President or executive officials are using 
secrecy to cover up violations of federal law.”). 
 18. For some readers, the title of this Article and the concept of illegal secrets may invoke 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/5
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In addressing the illegal secrecy dilemma, this Article adds an 
important observation to the recent literature cataloguing the structural 
characteristics of government secrets and their corresponding dangers. 
Scholars have recently argued that the form of secrecy most dangerous and 
repugnant to the Constitution is what some alternately term “deep 
secrecy”19 or “macro secrecy”20—that is, where the very existence of an 
executive secret is kept a secret as well.
21
 Under this view, deep secrecy 
eliminates any possible check on the abuse of executive power and is thus 
far more threatening to the constitutional order than “shallow secrets” or 
“micro secrecy” regarding, for example, how the executive branch 
implements policy.
22
  
The deep secrecy frame highlights the profound danger posed by secret 
national security programs and secret law.
23
 This Article argues, however, 
that “shallow secrets” can, in fact, be no less problematic than deep secrets 
when they insulate the government’s illegal conduct from judicial and 
 
 
sociologist and legal scholar Kim Lane Scheppele’s book, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND 
EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW (1988), which examines the myriad of ways in which the law 
confronts secrets—from trade secrets to contract law—and either privileges or punishes their 
disclosure. Scheppele’s book does not address state secrets or public access to government 
information. Thus, the topic and title of this Article references Scheppele’s work only insofar as it 
provides a rhetorical counterpoint to her discussion of the law of secrets. The question of whether 
some secrets held by the state are so threatening to the goals of accountability (such as secrets 
concealing government illegality) that they are metaphorically and substantively “illegal secrets” is 
unique to this discussion. 
 19. See David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 260 (2010) (distinguishing 
between deep and shallow secrets irrespective of their “function, their subject matter, or the competing 
interests in disclosure versus nondisclosure.”). Pozen draws upon sociologist and legal scholar Kim 
Lane Scheppele’s book LEGAL SECRETS, supra note 18, which introduced the concept of deep and 
shallow secrets within a discussion of private law. For an earlier discussion of executive secrecy that 
similarly focused on the structure of secret-keeping, rather than the contents of secrets, see Cheh, 
supra note 17, at 730 (noting that with respect to information access “there appears no principled, 
workable way for the courts to review the validity of particular secrecy decisions” such that courts 
should review “the system of secrecy, but not the secrets themselves”). 
 20. Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 489, 494 (2007) [hereinafter Separated Powers] (“[T]he Constitution demands that secrets 
generated by the political branches be shallow and, to make the shallowness meaningful, politically 
checkable.”); Heidi Kitrosser, Supremely Opaque?: Accountability, Transparency, and Presidential 
Supremacy, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 62, 64 n.9 (2010) [hereinafter Supremely Opaque] 
(discussing concepts of “macro” and “micro” secrecy, which Kitrosser acknowledges “parallel in 
important respects those of ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’ secrecy”); Heidi Kitrosser, “Macro-Transparency” 
as Structural Directive: A Look at the NSA Surveillance Controversy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1163 (2007) 
[hereinafter Macro-Transparency]. 
 21. See generally Kitrosser, Supremely Opaque, supra note 20. 
 22. Kitrosser, Separated Powers, supra note 20, at 494; Pozen, supra note 19.  
 23. Kitrosser, Supremely Opaque, supra note 20, at 67 (“Secret law occurs when the President 
not only circumvents a statute, but when he does so in secret. In such cases the President effectively 
amends public law without the knowledge of the public or the other branches . . . .”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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public review. Contrary to dominant conceptions of state secrecy, public 
knowledge that the government is keeping a secret (or the transformation 
of information from a deep secret to a shallow one) may in fact do very 
little to curb illegal government action.
 
Indeed, shallow secrets that 
conceal illegal or potentially illegal government conduct stand as a 
significant barrier to government transparency and accountability for a 
variety of important reasons.
24
  
First, as demonstrated by the targeted killing controversy, 
understanding how the Executive implements policy is often essential to 
assessing the legality of executive action and whether government has 
abused its power. Additionally, the progression of a secret from deep to 
shallow frequently does not produce greater opportunities for 
accountability, particularly where the Executive selectively releases 
information through strategic leaks in a way that serves the political 
interests of the Executive, but not the goals of accountability.
25
 For 
example, the NSA’s warrantless domestic surveillance program was 
arguably no longer a deep secret after news reports in 2005 and 2006 
revealed the agency’s warrantless interception of Americans’ phone and 
digital communications.
26
 Yet, it was not until 2013, when Edward 
Snowden leaked information regarding how the NSA was carrying out this 
domestic spying, including through the bulk collection of millions of 
Americans’ metadata, that concerns about the lawfulness of the agency’s 
actions deepened, and the prospect of reform and accountability 
materialized.
27
  
 
 
 24. Indeed, there may be reason to conclude that shallow secrets present a more persistent threat 
to democratic accountability given that, as Jameel Jaffer has noted, many controversial and legally 
suspect national security policies currently being debated have made the progression from deep to 
shallow secrecy, and are in fact, open secrets, or a “known unknown.” Jameel Jaffer, Known 
Unknowns, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 460–61 (2013). 
 25. See Louis Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon 
Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 278 (1971). 
 26. See NSA Spying on Americans, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (last visited Aug. 15, 2014), 
http://www.eff.org/nsa-spying; Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Spying 
Program Snared U.S. Calls, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2005; Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Spy Agency 
Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005; Leslie Cauley & John Diamond, 
Telecoms Let NSA Spy on Calls, USA TODAY (Feb. 6, 2006, 12:12 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday. 
com/news/washington/2006-02-05-nsa-telecoms_x.htm. 
 27. Ellen Nakashima, NSA Chief Defends Collecting Americans’ Data, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-chief-defends-collecting-americans-
data/2013/09/25/5db2583c-25f1-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852_story.html (describing the 2005 disclosures 
regarding “the NSA’s warrantless collection of domestic e-mails and phone-call content,” which was 
later authorized by Congress in 2008 under Section 702 of the Patriot Act, and the separate bulk 
metadata collection program exposed in 2013, which the Executive claims is authorized under Section 
215 of the Patriot Act). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/5
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Finally, allowing the government to keep secret details regarding the 
implementation and human costs of executive policies perpetuates false 
perceptions of government action, privileging the government-controlled 
narrative regarding executive abuses.
28
 This not only inevitably masks 
information critical to evaluating the legitimacy of government action, it 
risks manipulating public opinion with long-term consequences for the 
goals of accountability and adherence to the rule of law.  
One district court in New York Times v. DOJ (“The Citizen Drone 
Strike Case”) recently noted the “Alice-in-Wonderland nature” of the 
illegal secrecy dilemma.
29
 The court addressed whether the government 
should be permitted to keep secret its claimed legal authority to target and 
kill suspected terrorists, including United States citizens, through 
unmanned drone strikes abroad.
30
 Describing the question before her as “a 
veritable Catch-22,” District Judge Colleen McMahon saw “no way 
around the thicket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the 
Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly lawful 
certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution 
and laws, while keeping the reasons for its conclusion a secret.”31 This 
Article offers a way out of that thicket and demonstrates why concerns 
about illegality should be elevated within the broader discussion of 
government secrecy and how such concerns can be addressed when courts 
adjudicate disputes concerning access to government information.  
Part I of this Article examines the long relationship between secrecy 
and illegality through a historical lens. Part II defines the concept of illegal 
secrets and surfaces the difficulties presented by better engagement with 
them in the legal system. Part III examines the particular dangers illegal 
secrets pose for transparent and accountable government. Here, this 
Article also explains how the long-standing norms supporting government 
transparency as a general matter at their core reveal concerns about the 
aggregation of executive power and the concealing of official 
misconduct—concerns at their apex when the state possesses illegal 
secrets. Conversely, it examines how the traditional justifications for state 
secrecy have little resonance when illegal secrets are at issue. Part IV 
addresses the constitutional and statutory law addressed to government 
 
 
 28. See generally Cohen, supra note 4; see also Kim D. Chanbonpin, “We Don’t Want Dollars, 
Just Change”: Narrative Counter-Terrorism Strategy, an Inclusive Model for Social Healing, and the 
Truth About Torture Commission, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 21 (2011) (arguing that government 
narratives have prevailed regarding the U.S. government abuses against detainees).  
 29. N.Y. Times Co. v. DOJ, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 515–16. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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secrecy and the public’s right to know, paying particular attention to how 
concerns about government misconduct and illegal action have informed 
those systems. Part V critiques the FOIA decisions accepting the notion 
that government may legitimately keep secret information about its own 
unlawful acts. Part VI prescribes how courts can better check illegal 
secrets and proposes that the established illegality of the underlying 
conduct sought to be exposed is a powerful basis for compelling disclosure 
of government information.  
In pressing the case for greater exposure of illegal secrets, I 
acknowledge that judging secrecy through the lens of illegality increases 
the complexity of information access disputes before the courts. In 
particular, the legality of an executive act concealed by secrecy is not 
always knowable nor will it necessarily involve a clearly resolved question 
of law at the time of a public information access dispute. I endeavor to 
demonstrate, however, that the struggle to identify and allow the public to 
grapple with illegal secrets is critical to the long-term health of democracy, 
and that this complexity does not make meaningful judicial evaluation of 
illegal secrets insurmountable. In addition to more readily exposing secrets 
that conceal patently unlawful conduct, courts must, at the very least, 
consider whether sanctioning government secrecy will thwart public 
debate regarding potentially unlawful government action. The more 
plausible the allegation of illegality, the stronger the basis for disclosure.  
I. SECRECY AND ILLEGALITY: THE NOT-SO-SECRET HISTORY 
Theorists have long noted the “strong association between secrecy and 
bad acts.”32 As philosopher and ethicist Sissela Bok has noted, secrecy 
does not always conceal bad acts, but bad acts nearly always invite 
secrecy.
33
 Bok provides a useful explanation of the symbiotic and 
corrupting relationship between secrecy and illegality, noting that secrecy 
has the capacity to both “breed corruption” and “follows malfeasance like 
a shadow.”34 This dangerous and symbiotic relationship has persisted 
throughout U.S. history,
35
 as illustrated by the following, necessarily 
abbreviated examination of the role of secrecy in the nation’s history.  
 
 
 32. See Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 883–94, 886. 
 33. Id. at 886 n.162 (noting that Bok does not contend “that secrecy is always bad,” but rather 
that “‘all that is discreditable and all wrongdoing seek[s] out secrecy’”) (quoting BOK, supra note 2, at 
26). 
 34. BOK, supra note 2, at 26. 
 35. DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS 4 (1981). 
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A. Secrecy at the Founding 
Most of the literature addressed to the role of government secrecy at 
the nation’s founding has focused on the Framers’ views regarding the 
advantages of a unitary Executive and the scope of inter-branch checks on 
executive secrecy powers.
36
 Less attention has been paid, however, to the 
Framers’ concerns about the relationship between secrecy and government 
misconduct as a normative matter. But implicit in the Framers’ views 
about the advantages of a unitary Executive was a recognition that state 
secrecy could produce dishonest and corrupt government. 
For example, Alexander Hamilton, while famously extolling the 
advantages of a unitary executive to act with “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, 
and dispatch” simultaneously recognized that securing these traits in one 
individual presented another advantage: that the detection of Executive 
wrongdoing was more feasible.
37
 He noted that “multiplication of the 
executive adds to the difficulty of detection,” including the “opportunity of 
discovering [misconduct] with facility and clearness.” 38 
Others in the Founding Era generation similarly noted the potential for 
secrecy to conceal wrongdoing. For example, during the North Carolina 
ratification debate, William Davie argued that the “predominant principle” 
arising out of proposals for a unitary executive at the Constitutional 
Convention was not the capacity for secrecy to promote vigor and dispatch 
in the Executive, but “the more obvious responsibility of one person.”39 
He noted, that “if there were a plurality of persons, and a crime should be 
committed, when their conduct was to be examined, it would be 
impossible to fix the fact on any one of them, but that the public were 
never at a loss when there was but one man.”40  
The Framers were thus wary of the potential for secrecy to produce 
dishonesty, even while they employed it themselves when crafting the 
nation’s constitution.41 As legal scholar Heidi Kitrosser has noted, this 
history suggests that though the Framers accepted that certain state 
functions required secrecy, they simultaneously recognized “the capacity 
 
 
 36. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 35 (analyzing founding era views on executive privilege); 
Gregory S. McNeal, The Pre-NSC Origins of National Security Expertise, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1585 
(2012). 
 37. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 38. Id. at 427–29. 
 39. HOFFMAN, supra note 35, at 30. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See HOFFMAN, supra note 35, at 21 (describing Founders’ divergent views about the secrecy 
surrounding the drafting and debate of the Constitution). 
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for abuse inherent in such power and appeared to assume that 
congressional oversight would keep such capacity under tight political 
control by threatening to expose the existence or even content of 
secrets.”42 As the next Section demonstrates, secrecy and illegality 
converged with destructive results during the second half of the Twentieth 
Century, illustrating that the structural advantages of a unitary executive 
have not always minimized abuses, nor led to more accountability.
43
  
 
B. Secrecy and Illegality in the Watergate Era 
 
The Watergate scandal is the most notable American example of 
secrecy’s capacity to enable and shield executive misconduct.44 During 
Congressional hearings considering the 1974 FOIA amendments, Senator 
Ted Kennedy lamented the role of secrecy during Watergate, noting how it 
emboldened high level government officials to casually plan crimes like 
bugging and blackmail from the Attorney General’s office.45 Not only did 
secrecy during Watergate facilitate such brazen abuses of power, once the 
scandal unfolded, President Nixon again employed secrecy, through his 
assertion of executive privilege, in an abortive strategy for preventing 
those abuses from coming to light. In urging greater openness in public 
affairs after Watergate, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren 
wrote in 1974, “[i]t would be difficult to name a more efficient ally of 
corruption than secrecy.”46  
Beyond Watergate, during the Twentieth Century, secrecy facilitated 
and hid a wide range of illegal executive conduct. The CIA figured 
 
 
 42. Kitrosser, Separated Powers, supra note 20, at 526. 
 43. That is particularly true as a practical matter given that Congressional oversight over shallow 
secrets involving national security matters is often delayed, ineffective, or entirely lacking. See Serge 
Grossman & Michael Simon, Short Essay, And Congress Shall Know the Truth: The Pressing Need for 
Restructuring Congressional Oversight of Intelligence, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 435 (2008); Samuel 
Brenner, “I Am a Bit Sickened”: Examining Archetypes of Congressional War Crimes Oversight after 
My Lai and Abu Ghraib, 205 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2010) (arguing that congressional leaders after both 
the U.S. military’s massacre at My Lai in Vietnam and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib “used 
their oversight functions to obscure the facts, hobble potential prosecutions of high military officials, 
and shuffle embarrassing episodes off the national and international stage as quickly as possible”).  
 44. KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOVERNMENT: THE POST-WATERGATE 
INVESIGATIONS OF THE CIA AND FBI 15 (1996) (arguing that Watergate “demonstrated that ‘national 
security’ claims could serve as veils for illegal activity”). 
 45. Freedom of Information, Executive Privilege, and Secrecy in Government: Hearings Before 
the Subcomms. on Admin. Practice & Procedure and Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary & the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 93d 
Cong., 209–10 (1973) [hereinafter Executive Privilege]. 
 46. Earl Warren, Governmental Secrecy: Corruption’s Ally, 60 A.B.A. J. 550, 550 (1974). 
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prominently in this history.
47
 For example, only four months after 
President Nixon’s resignation, the New York Times revealed that Nixon 
had utilized the CIA in secret, domestic intelligence operations that 
included the illegal wiretapping and surveillance of citizens.
48
 The CIA 
targeted reporters and others whom the Administration feared would 
criticize executive policies or reveal executive secrets and deception.
49
 In 
fact, after former military analyst Daniel Ellsberg leaked the classified 
Pentagon study about the Vietnam War later known as the Pentagon 
Papers to the media, President Nixon’s White House “plumbers,” aided by 
the CIA, broke into the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist in an attempt to 
discredit him.
50
  
The allegations of domestic CIA surveillance prompted the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, under the leadership of its Chair, Senator Frank 
Church, to investigate.
51
 A simultaneous and steady stream of media 
revelations regarding additional CIA and FBI abuses led the Church 
Committee to expand its focus from domestic intelligence gathering under 
Nixon to include questionable executive branch activities committed 
during the four, previous presidential administrations.
52
  
In a damning, multi-volume report, the Committee later found evidence 
that the CIA had plotted assassination attempts against foreign leaders, 
intervened to disrupt foreign elections in Chile, where the agency sought 
to ignite a coup,
53
 subjected unconsenting human subjects to drug testing, 
and engaged in a variety of other criminal and unconstitutional acts.
54
 The 
Church Committee further concluded that the CIA, FBI and NSA had 
engaged in widespread and illegal, covert surveillance activities aimed at 
 
 
 47. See generally TIM WEINER, LEGACY OF ASHES: THE HISTORY OF THE CIA (2008). 
 48. See Seymour Hersh, Huge CIA Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other 
Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974, at A1 (describing the CIA’s “massive, illegal 
domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon Administration against the antiwar movement and 
other dissident groups in the United States”); Weiner, supra note 47. 
 49. MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, TOP SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE 
RIGHT TO KNOW (1977). 
 50. WEINER, supra note 47, at 378 (noting Howard Hunt’s testimony implicating the CIA’s 
“technical assistance” with the Plumbers’ break-in). The break-in and other government misconduct 
undertaken in an effort to investigate and smear Ellsberg and his lawyers led to the dismissal of a 
criminal indictment against him for espionage, conspiracy and theft arising out of his leaking of the 
Pentagon Papers. See HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 49, at 13–14. 
 51. OLMSTED, supra note 44, at 81–82. 
 52. Id.; see CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at Book II, 292. 
 53. Seymour Hersh, CIA Chief Tells House of $8-Million Campaign Against Allende in ‘70–’73, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1974, at 1.  
 54. See CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5.  
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domestic political organizations, religious groups, and individuals, 
including politicians, civil rights advocates, and anti-war protesters.
55
  
Legally questionable covert activity by the intelligence agencies, and in 
particular by the CIA, continued well after the Church Committee 
completed its duties. For example, during the Iran-Contra Affair of the 
1980s the Reagan White House secretly directed the CIA to provide aid to 
the Nicaraguan Contras through covert arms sales to Iran, in spite of an 
embargo on Iranian arms sales and Congress’s restrictions on further 
funding of the Contras.
56
 
One might respond to this historical snapshot by concluding that the 
CIA’s mandate to engage in activity that is often secret by its very nature 
renders illicit conduct inevitable, expected, and perhaps even desired. Or, 
even more cynically, one might posit that the secrecy surrounding CIA 
activities stems from an unspoken mandate to engage in illicit conduct. As 
an army general with a hand in creating a precursor agency to the CIA 
concluded at the end of World War II: “Clandestine intelligence operations 
involve a constant breaking of all the rules . . . To put it baldly, such 
operations are necessarily extralegal and sometimes illegal.”57 More 
recently, others have noted the tension between the CIA’s mandate to 
gather intelligence and legal accountability norms.
58
  
But government institutions like the FBI and the military that lack the 
same deep culture of secrecy (and perhaps perceived exceptionalism) as 
the CIA have also embraced secrecy in the service of illegal secrets, 
suggesting something far more fundamental about the symbiotic 
relationship between secrecy and illegality in government.  
 
 
 55. Id., BOOK II, at 5–20. As documented in Tim Weiner’s history of the CIA, subsequent 
disclosures have added to the information revealed by the Church Committee, demonstrating even 
further that the agency has engaged in a long history of illegal conduct. WEINER, supra note 47. 
 56. See LAWRENCE E. WALSH, IRAN-CONTRA: THE FINAL REPORT 199–309 (1994) (detailing the 
CIA’s secret role in the Iran-Contra scandal). Commentators have also noted the role of secrecy in 
masking wrongdoing and frustrating accountability during the Iran-Contra scandal. See Dr. Anthony 
Simones, The Iran-Contra Affair: Ten Years Later, 67 UMKC L. REV. 61, 75 (1998) (“The conflict 
between secrecy and accountability permeated the Iran-Contra Affair.”); see also Sandra D. Jordan, 
Classified Information and Conflicts in Independent Counsel Prosecutions: Balancing the Scales of 
Justice after Iran-Contra, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1651, 1654 (1991). 
 57. WEINER, supra note 47, at 13 (quoting letter of Brigadier General John Magruder). 
 58. See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 
9/11 94 (2012) (“Democratic accountability for secret intelligence activities is one of the hardest 
problems in constitutional government because public debate and review of these activities are 
inconsistent with the intelligence mission.”). Others have described this problem as being more about 
the agency’s “culture” of secrecy and disengagement with concerns about legality than the nature of 
intelligence gathering itself. See CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 12, at 55–57 (asserting that 
concerns about illegality within the agency are limited to “avoiding liability and political fall-out”). 
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As Christina Wells has noted in critiquing the FBI’s history of 
misconduct in times of perceived crisis, secrecy and abuse of power often 
work hand-in-hand.
59
 Citing the Church Committee’s revelations 
regarding the FBI’s questionable activities beginning after World War I 
through the 1970s, Wells persuasively contends that “the FBI’s abuse of 
its intelligence-gathering power . . . could not have occurred without 
control of confidential and public information.”60  
The Executive has also improperly shielded legally questionable 
military action. For example, in 1969, President Nixon secretly ordered the 
bombing of Cambodia, a neutral nation, keeping most members of 
Congress and the public in the dark about the action for nearly three 
years.
61
 The secrecy surrounding the operation was not borne of military 
necessity, but was designed to thwart public debate about escalating 
military operations in Vietnam and the very serious legal and diplomatic 
questions raised by the bombing of a neutral nation.
62
  
Secrecy has also empowered the military to conceal war crimes and 
other abuses. For example, the notorious 1968 massacre at My Lai by U.S. 
troops of more than one-hundred unarmed, Vietnamese civilians, 
including women and children, remained a secret for more than a year 
after it occurred until a whistleblower broke the silence.
63
 As concluded in 
a later report by the House Armed Services Subcommittee in 1970, 
“military and civilian officials in Vietnam had attempted to ‘cover up’ 
what had happened.”64 My Lai is not an isolated case; unfortunately there 
are both antecedent
65
 and subsequent examples of the military suppressing 
information about war crimes.
66
  
 
 
 59. Christina E. Wells, Information Control in Times of Crisis: The Tools of Repression, 30 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 451, 493–94 (2004). 
 60. Id. at 471–79, 493. 
 61. HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 49, at 14. 
 62. Id. at 14–19. Exacerbating this deception, while directing the secret bombings, the Nixon 
Administration simultaneously assured the American public that it was working to end the war in 
Vietnam. Id. at 16. 
 63. See Brenner, supra note 43, at 72. 
 64. Id. at 26 (citing Editorial, House-Panel Says the Army Hampered Investigation Into Songmy 
Incident, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1970, at 15); see also Investigation of the My Lai Incident: Hearings 
of the Armed Services S. Comm. of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 91st Cong. 4 (1970), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/ML_investigation.html. Even after Congress and the military 
began to investigate the incident, some officials tried to obstruct the further release of information 
about it. Brenner, supra note 43, at 84. 
 65. See, e.g., Tae-Ung Baik, A War Crime Against an Ally’s Civilians: The No Gun Ri Massacre, 
15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 455 (2001) (examining massacre of more than one 
hundred South Korean refugees, including women and children, by U.S. soldiers during the Korean 
War that remained shrouded in secrecy for nearly fifty years). 
 66. Most recently, secrecy surrounded the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq until 
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After this bleak period of government mistakes and crimes committed 
under the cover of secrecy, a period of reform (and, for some institutions, 
self-examination) followed.
67
 After My Lai, the U.S. military recognized 
the need for all members of the armed forces to respect and engage with 
the laws of armed conflict.
68
 This resulted not only in more rigorous 
training regarding the military’s legal obligations, but sparked a long-
lasting institutional commitment to the principles and values of 
accountability.
69
 The FBI similarly embraced a period of reform.
70
 And 
during this period, the efforts to curb executive abuses and promote 
accountability took on government secrecy directly as well. On the heels 
of Watergate in 1974, Congress amended FOIA to require greater judicial 
oversight of government secrecy claims.
71
  
Yet, in spite of secrecy and illegality’s dangerous history, and 
notwithstanding these reforms, an entrenched system of secrecy in 
America has remained.
72
 Indeed, even before 9-11, a secret government 
began to take shape once again.
73
  
 
 
whistleblowers leaked images of the abuse to the media in spring 2004. See Brenner, supra note 43, at 
37–38. The government did its best to conceal the abuses from public view, and even after their 
exposure, some members of Congress attempted to limit public access to information about the 
scandal. ALASDAIR ROBERTS, BLACKED OUT: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 52–
53, 84 (2006) (noting that the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee “successfully 
prevented committee members from requesting additional documents from the Bush Administration” 
regarding Abu Ghraib). But see GOLDSMITH, supra note 58, at 147–48 (making the case that 
accountability systems and the military’s chain of command “kicked in” and largely worked after Abu 
Ghraib). 
 67. Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
289, 299–300 (2012) (describing the creation of permanent congressional intelligence oversight 
committees and the enactment of FISA, among other examples of reform). 
 68. CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 12, at 52–53. 
 69. Id. at 51–52. 
 70. Seeking to avoid a repeat of the widespread constitutional violations documented by the 
Church Committee investigation President Carter enacted guidelines in 1976 designed to curb the 
FBI’s domestic intelligence gathering activities. See Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The 
Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1208 (2004) (referencing the 
Levi Guidelines, reprinted in F.B.I. Statutory Charter: Hearings on S. 1612 Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 235–41 (1978)).  
 71. Martin E. Halstuk, Holding the Spymasters Accountable after 9/11: A Proposed Model for 
CIA Disclosure Requirements under the Freedom of Information Act, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 
79, 92 n.76 (2004) (quoting Sen. Ted Kennedy’s statement during the hearings preceding the 1974 
amendments to FOIA that the Watergate hearings “demonstrate[] beyond debate that government 
secrecy breeds government deceit”) (quoting Executive Privilege, supra note 45, at 209–10). 
 72. MOYNIHAN, supra note 5, at 227 (concluding in 1998 that “[i]t is time to dismantle 
government secrecy, this most pervasive of Cold War-era regulations”).  
 73. ROBERTS, supra note 66, at 36 (noting that prior to 9-11, “the process of rebuilding [the] 
walls of secrecy had begun”). 
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C. Secrecy and Illegality: The Recent History 
As commentators have widely acknowledged, after 9-11 secrecy in 
government reached another pinnacle;
74
 the Bush Administration’s 
relationship with secrecy displayed secrecy’s full potential to both conceal 
and enable questionable policies and executive overreaching.
75
 As 
numerous scholars have persuasively illustrated, the symbiotic relationship 
between secrecy and illegality during the Bush years manifested itself with 
respect to numerous secret programs—the questionable legality of which 
demanded their secret character.
76
  
For example, secrecy was instrumental to the Bush Administration’s 
secret warrantless wiretapping of U.S. citizens in contravention of FISA. 
The Administration argued that national security compelled the program’s 
secrecy because oversight of its activities would have necessarily exposed 
the government’s counterterrorism strategy.77 Secrecy also helped define 
the Bush Administration’s clandestine, extrajudicial transfer of terrorism 
suspects to foreign countries for the purpose of torture and interrogation
78
 
and its torture and detention of terrorism suspects at secret prisons 
abroad.
79
 In each of these settings, secrecy empowered the government to 
elude legal constraints prohibiting such activities.
80
 Indeed, the use of 
“black sites” for secret detention and interrogation during this period—a 
concept and physical structure defined by secrecy—epitomizes the 
exploitation of secrecy for unlawful ends. 
 
 
 74. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model to 
Domestic Law Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1622 (2004); Nadine Strossen, Maintaining 
Human Rights in Time of Terrorism: A Case Study in the Value of Legal Scholarship in Shaping Law 
and Public Policy, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 373, 383–84 (2003). 
 75. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 66, at 69; Eric Lane et al., Too Big a Canon in the President’s 
Arsenal: Another Look at United States v. Nixon, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 737, 767 (2010) (“It is 
difficult to summon a starker example of destructive policies enabled through the power of secrecy 
than those implemented by the Administration of George W. Bush.”). 
 76. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741 (2009); 
JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE: THE SECRET PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2004); 
John D. Podesta, Shadow Creep: Government Secrecy Since 9/11, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 
361. 
 77. See Kitrosser, Macro-Transparency, supra note 20, at 1199. 
 78. Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of 
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1393 (2007) (describing perverse “incentive structure” at work in 
extraordinary rendition: “the sending country has an investment in the receiving country’s abusive 
practices and both states want those abuses to remain secret”). 
 79. See Bagchi, supra note 3, at 42–43. 
 80. Id. at 42–43 (“Secrecy makes it impossible for law to govern the torturing state . . . .”). 
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The entrenchment and attraction of secrecy, of course, did not end with 
the Bush Administration. As other Presidents have done before him,
81
 
President Obama promised at the start of his first term as President a new 
era of openness in government.
82
 But since that time, secrecy has 
continued to mask controversial and legally questionable national security 
policies.  
The President has cloaked in secrecy the purported legal authority for 
killing U.S. citizens and others through unmanned drone strikes far from 
any battlefield abroad.
83
 The Department of Justice has continued to 
invoke the state secrets privilege to defeat litigation challenging 
extraordinary rendition on behalf of individuals who claim they were 
tortured at the direction or with the acquiescence of the United States and 
in litigation challenging the targeted killing of U.S. citizens abroad.
84
 
Moreover, in spite of the reforms of the 1970s, the FBI is again covertly 
collecting intelligence through domestic operations that implicate 
protected First Amendment activities, including the surveillance and 
 
 
 81. HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 49, at 4 (noting that “Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford, 
to name just two” came into office committed to a more open system but ended up “leading the nation 
into foreign adventures, vetoing or threatening to veto antisecrecy legislation, and condemning leaks of 
information they sought to keep secret”). 
 82. See President Barrack Obama, Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter 
Transparency Memo], http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpen Government 
(pledging in a directive to the heads of executive branch agencies to create “an unprecedented level of 
openness in Government”). It is not unusual for Presidents to promise openness at the start of their 
terms, and it is not uncommon for them to break those promises. See Lane et al., supra note 75, at 737 
n.4 (noting similar inaugural pronouncements by Presidents Nixon and Ford). 
 83. Scott Shane, Renewing a Debate Over Secrecy, and Its Costs, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2012, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/07/world/americas/drones-and-cyberattacks-renew-
debate-over-security.html; Jameel Jaffer & Nathan Freed Wessler, The C.I.A.’s Misuse of Secrecy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2012) (op-ed), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/opinion/the-
cias-misuse-of-secrecy.html. Jaffer and Wessler note that the Obama Administration has publically 
defended the controversial use of drone strikes as “effective, lawful and closely supervised,” while at 
the same time in court, the CIA refuses “to acknowledge that the targeted killing program exists.” Id. 
Indeed, until it proved strategically advantageous to leak and then officially release it, the 
Administration had long concealed an Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) white paper summarizing the 
Administration’s legal justification for its targeted killing of U.S. citizens abroad, even though the 
document was unclassified. See Steven Aftergood, DOJ White Paper Released as a Matter of 
“Discretion,” FAS.ORG (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2013/02/leak_boosts/ 
(noting that the DOJ released the OLC White Paper on targeted killing to FOIA requesters several 
days after it was leaked, after having fought the unclassified documents disclosure in FOIA litigation).  
 84. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); Brief for Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 43, Al-
Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-cv-1469), available at http://www.law 
fareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/usgbrief.pdf. 
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infiltration of mosques with undercover informants.
85
 And secrecy remains 
the government’s response to challenges of such programs’ legality.86 
Indeed, in many of these contexts, the government has claimed expansive 
authority to conceal information from the public.
87
  
The recent disclosures of the NSA’s massive, domestic surveillance 
program have sparked a recommitment to transparency among many 
government officials—at least on a rhetorical level—and some momentum 
toward reform.
88
 Yet, given its pervasive scope,
89
 secrecy under the 
Obama Presidency may be difficult to disengage.
90
  
Indeed, as the press has widely reported, the Obama Administration has 
prosecuted more government employees for releasing information to the 
public under the Espionage Act than the four previous Administrations 
combined.
91
 Critics contend that the Administration has aggressively 
 
 
 85. See EMILY BERMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE: NEW POWERS, 
NEW RISKS 2, 4, 29, 35 (2011), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/b80aa0bab0b425857d_jdm6b 
8776.pdf. 
 86. Hamed Aleaziz, Want to Sue the FBI for Spying on Your Mosque? Sorry, That’s Secret, 
MOTHER JONES (Aug. 8, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/08/state-secrets-
fazaga-v-fbi (reporting that President Obama’s Justice Department invoked the state secrets privilege 
to defend against litigation by the ACLU and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 
challenging the FBI’s intelligence-gathering activities targeting Muslim Americans, particularly the 
use of undercover informants and surveillance). For a thorough, recent explanation of the frequency 
and nature of the Executive’s invocation of the state secret privilege, see Laura K. Donohue, The 
Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77 (2010). 
 87. See Jaffer & Wessler, supra note 83 (critiquing the government’s Glomar response to the 
ACLU’s FOIA request about the CIA’s targeted killing program); Aleaziz, supra note 86 (noting the 
exceptional nature of the DOJ invoking the state secrets privilege to conceal the FBI’s domestic 
surveillance of Americans); Jewel v. NSA, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (rejecting 
government’s attempt to invoke the state secrets privilege in defending challenge to NSA’s dragnet 
surveillance of Americans’ communication records). 
 88. See Ellen Nakashima, NSA Bills Set up a Choice in Congress: End Bulk Collection of Phone 
Records or Endorse It, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2013), http://washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-bills-set-up-a-choice-in-congress-and-bulk-collection-of-phone-records-or-endorse-
it/2013/10/28/99007880-3fd5-11e3-a75-f032898f2dbc_story.html. 
 89. Jaffer, supra note 24, at 460 (suggesting that “[w]e live in an era of unprecedented 
government secrecy” in terms of the quality of the information concealed and “the means government 
uses to safeguard them”). 
 90. See Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 399, 400–01 (2009) (noting that “[c]oncerns about excessive government secrecy have 
accompanied the national security classification system for decades” but that in recent years 
“classification—specifically overclassification—has increased, not diminished”); Dana Priest & 
William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, WASH. POST 
(July 19, 2010), http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-
beyond-control/ (detailing the widespread, secret, domestic national security apparatus); see also Jon 
D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 
96 CAL. L. REV. 901 (2008) (describing the federal government’s secret reliance upon private actors to 
deliver vast amounts of intelligence information). 
 91. Phil Mattingly & Hans Nichols, Obama Pursuing Leakers Sends Warning to Whistle-
Blowers, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 17, 2012, 8:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-
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identified and punished those who have leaked information about illegal 
(or at least legally questionable) government conduct, while it has shown 
no interest whatsoever in punishing or even exposing the underlying 
illegal conduct itself.
92
  
At the same time, the complexity of the modern national security state 
makes holding government accountable particularly difficult. For example, 
in counterterrorism operations abroad (including targeted drone strikes) 
the duties of the conventional military and intelligence agencies have 
increasingly converged,
93
 blurring responsibility for violations of law.
94
  
These developments illustrate that the problem of illegal secrets is a 
prominent and complex one that warrants meaningful scholarly attention 
and more serious consideration by the courts.  
II. CONCEPTUALIZING THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGAL SECRETS  
The recent literature analyzing government secrets has largely 
theorized secrets’ structural characteristics, particularly whether they are 
deep or shallow secrets and thus capable of providing opportunities for 
checks on executive conduct by both the citizenry and other branches of 
government.
95
 This scholarship makes an important contribution to the 
greater understanding of government secrecy within the constitutional 
order, and in particular helps provide greater understanding of the threats 
 
 
18/obama-pursuing-leakers-sends-warning-to-whistle-blowers.html; Josh Gerstein, Justice Dept. 
Cracks Down on Leaks, POLITICO (May 25, 2010, 4:44 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/ 
0510/ 37721.html (quoting Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists: “They’re going 
after this at every opportunity and with unmatched vigor”). 
 92. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Law-Free Zone and Back Again, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 551, 
576–78; Tim Shorrock, Obama’s Crackdown on Whistleblowers, THE NATION (Mar. 26, 2013), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/173521/obamas-crackdown-whistleblowers; see also Scott Horton, 
The DOJ’s Torturer-Protection Program, HARPER’S MAGAZINE (Jan. 11, 2013, 3:28 PM), 
http://www.harpers.org/blog/2013/01/the-dojs-torturer-protection-program/ (describing prosecution of 
former CIA agent John Kirakou for releasing details about CIA torture program and describing it as 
“confirmation of an official policy . . . those who rat on torturers and program masterminds will be 
treated ruthlessly”); Scott Shane, From Spy to Source to Convict, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/1/06/us/former-cia-officer-is-the-first-to-face-prison-for-a-
classified-leak.html. 
 93. See generally Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 
10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 539 (2012).  
 94. See id.; see also CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 12 (criticizing the secret 
cooperation between the military’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the CIA in 
carrying out drone strikes abroad, specifically the blurring lines of authority, accountability, and 
responsibility to mitigate civilian harm). 
 95. See Pozen, supra note 19. For a discussion a sustained discussion of the concept of “macro 
transparency,” see the multiple works of Heidi Kitrosser, supra note 20. 
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to democracy posed by deep secrecy.
96
 But shallow secrets that conceal 
illegal, and potentially illegal, conduct by the Executive also powerfully 
undermine opportunities for government accountability. Irrespective of the 
depth of secrecy at issue, whether the government should be permitted to 
keep its illegal action secret warrants more serious scholarly and judicial 
consideration. 
That question requires consideration of what exactly is encompassed 
within the realm of illegal secrets as well as how the public, deprived of 
information about even shallow government secrets, can establish or 
discern an underlying violation of law. But first, the symbolic worth of 
labeling certain government secrets illegal secrets warrants preliminary 
discussion.  
The concept of an illegal secret fittingly connotes the corrupt and anti-
democratic nature of secret government wrongdoing. The term identifies 
and names the long-standing symbiotic relationship between government 
secrecy and the abuse of power, whereby secrecy can both enable 
lawlessness and is all too easily embraced after the fact when government 
actors violate the law.
97
 The idea of an illegal secret also evokes the 
immorality of government abuse such as torture that exploits secrecy and 
can inflict more suffering because of it.
98
 Evocation of this broader, and 
perhaps even colloquial, conception of illegality, captures the pernicious 
nature of the government concealing from the public information relevant 
to its own wrongdoing in the same way the terms “illegal settlements” or 
“illegal alien” arguably convey a host of pejorative meaning beyond the 
fact of an individual’s technical violation of the law.99  
Although the symbolic message of the term “illegal secret” helps 
conceptualize the danger presented by the prospect of secretive 
 
 
 96. See supra note 19 & 20. Pozen sees value in distinguishing between deep and shallow secrets 
irrespective of their “subject matter,” and seeks to provide “a vocabulary and an analytic framework 
with which to describe, assess, and compare secrets, without having to judge what they conceal.” 
Pozen, supra note 19, at 257. But he also recognizes the limits of the distinction he proposes. See id. at 
276 (“Some shallow secrets may be highly problematic on account of their subject. Some deep secrets 
may be benign. . . . Appreciating the deep/shallow distinction may help clarify the normative questions 
raised by any particular secret. It cannot in itself answer them.”). 
 97. See BOK, supra note 2; Schlesinger, supra note 2.  
 98. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 99. Irus Braverman, Powers of Illegality: House Demolitions and Resistance in East Jerusalem, 
32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 333, 342 (2007) (discussing so-called “illegal settlements” in East Jerusalem 
and suggesting that illegality exists as “a significant structuring device in its own right”) (citing 
DAVINA COOPER, POWER IN STRUGGLE: FEMINISM, SEXUALITY AND THE STATE (1995)); GERALD L. 
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 177 
(1996); Liliana M. Garcés, Note, Evolving Notions of Membership: The Significance of Communal 
Ties in Alienage Jurisprudence, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1037, 1039–40 (1998). 
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government wrongdoing, invoking the term alone cannot, of course, 
resolve which government secrets should be disclosed. Whether the law 
should compel disclosure of what I term illegal secrets requires a 
substantive consideration of whether government institutions or actors 
have violated the constitution, acted in defiance of statutes, or violated 
applicable international treaties and norms. Classifying secrets that 
conceal such presumptively unlawful conduct as illegal secrets is on the 
one hand straightforward. Yet, even this category of illegal secrets can be 
difficult to discern given that the parties to an information access dispute 
and members of the public more broadly may not have access to 
information that would permit them to establish that what the government 
has done in secret violates the law.  
Identifying illegal secrets can be difficult for a host of other reasons, as 
well. For example, although the general factual picture of secret 
government action may be publically known—like the targeting killing of 
U.S. citizens abroad—the conduct at issue may not have been established 
as unlawful or the question of its legality—like that of the NSA’s bulk 
collection of Americans’ phone records—may be the subject of debate or 
disagreement within the courts.
100
 Moreover, the secret at issue may be 
susceptible to claims by the Executive, particularly in the realm of national 
security policy, that the President possesses unilateral constitutional 
authority as Commander in Chief to engage in such conduct irrespective of 
statutory restraints imposed by Congress or international law.
101
 And still, 
even where the threshold question of illegality is established, some, 
including the government, will invariably contend that national security 
priorities nevertheless justify keeping illegal secrets in the dark. Assessing 
government secrecy through the frame of illegality also raises the problem 
of whether information access disputes such as FOIA litigation are 
appropriate vehicles for examining the lawfulness of government action.  
 
 
 100. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (2013) (enjoining the NSA’s warrantless collection of 
bulk telephone metadata after finding that it likely violates the Fourth Amendment); ACLU v. Clapper, 
959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (2013) (upholding the constitutionality of the very same program).  
 101. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 706 (2008) 
(describing the consistent claim by Bush Administration lawyers that the President, as Commander in 
Chief, possesses “a right to act in defiance of congressional limitations in a range of areas” including 
those applicable to detention and interrogation policy). John Yoo, for example, has argued that because 
“[w]ar’s unpredictability can demand decisive and often secret action,” the Framers intended to create 
“an executive with its own independent powers to manage foreign affairs and address emergencies 
which, almost by definition, cannot be addressed by existing laws.” JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER 
MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 112, 119–20 (2006). 
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All of these considerations illuminate the persistent, yet under-
theorized, problem of illegal secrets—which the law and literature 
addressed to government transparency have far too long ignored. This 
Article contends that although identifying and assessing illegal secrets can 
be difficult, given the consequences for democratic accountability, the 
challenge does not justify the status quo: allowing the government by 
default to keep illegal action secret by deeming the illegality of conduct 
concealed by secrecy irrelevant to the merits of disclosure.
102
 In Part VI, I 
revisit these quandaries and propose some initial interventions to move 
forward the law’s engagement with illegal secrets. But first I present what 
may be intuitive, but is by no means well-established: the numerous 
reasons why in a democracy the law must be wary of illegal secrets and 
better interrogate government claims that it is entitled to withhold such 
secrets from the public. 
III. THE DANGERS OF ILLEGAL SECRETS DEFINED 
A. The Transparency Rationales 
Nearly all of the long-standing rationales justifying transparency in 
government as a general matter reflect concerns about the aggregation of 
executive power and the concealing of official misconduct—acute dangers 
when the state possesses illegal secrets. For example, one of the leading 
arguments for transparency in government is the notion that without the 
checks of dissenters, the scrutiny of critics, as well as the self-regulation 
imposed by the awareness of outsiders’ critical gaze, secrecy leads to bad 
decision-making.
103
  
Numerous commentators have made this critique from an historical 
perspective, including, most notably, late sociologist and Senator Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan.
104
 In his book devoted to the subject of secrecy, 
Moynihan methodically chronicled how excessive secrecy during the Cold 
War made possible the abuses of the McCarthy Era
105
 and led to serious 
miscalculations of the Soviet threat, depriving the United States of an 
enlightened foreign policy and resulting in the misallocation of valuable 
 
 
 102. See Wizner, supra note 16. 
 103. Kitrosser, Separated Powers, supra note 20, at 537 (“[c]ountless scholars, journalists, 
legislators, and executive branch officials have noted secrecy’s judgment-clouding and security-
hindering effects in relation to historic and current events.”). 
 104. MOYNIHAN, supra note 5. 
 105. See id.; see also EDWARD A. SHILS, THE TORMENT OF SECRECY: THE BACKGROUND AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN SECURITY POLICIES (1956). 
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resources.
106
 Others have similarly recounted how secrecy degraded the 
quality of U.S. policymaking during the Vietnam era.
107
 Several more 
recent assessments of government mistakes made under the cover of 
secrecy, including the intelligence failures preceding 9-11,
108
 have 
embraced this reasoning as well.  
Part of this rationale rests upon concerns about the corrupting influence 
of groupthink—the tendency of isolated groups to seek consensus without 
critically testing ideas through opposing viewpoints.
109
 In contrast, 
officials’ awareness of public scrutiny and the prospect of accountability, 
so the theory goes, can encourage more well-reasoned and just 
outcomes.
110
 This justification for government transparency has obvious 
relevance for illegal secrets. The public scrutiny and accountability 
occasioned by transparency can deter government actors from pursuing 
unlawful actions.  
Another widely recognized rationale for transparency is government 
officials’ tendency to exploit secrecy to multiply individual or agency 
 
 
 106. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 5. 
 107. See generally STEVEN L. KATZ, GOVERNMENT SECRECY: DECISIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY 
11–27 (1987); HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 49, at 3, 7–10 (describing foreign policy “debacles” 
during this period). 
 108. Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S. 
REP. NO. 108-301, at 18 (2004), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/108301.pdf 
(concluding that excessive secrecy and lack of outside scrutiny adversely effected the CIA’s 
assessment of weapons of mass destruction in pre-war Iraq); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The 
Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 138 (2006) 
(discussing 9-11 Commission’s finding that publicity regarding the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, the 
so-called 20th 9-11 highjacker could have allowed greater coordination among counterterrorism 
agencies and more proactive intelligence efforts) (citing NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS 
UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 247, 276 (2004)); Aftergood, supra note 
90, at 400 (quoting Congressional testimony of former Justice Department official Jack L. Goldsmith: 
“There’s no doubt that the extreme secrecy [associated with the Bush Administration’s Terrorist 
Surveillance Program] . . . led to a lot of mistakes”). 
 109. See Gia B. Lee, The President’s Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 236, 242 (2008) 
(“Isolating the President and his advisors from public scrutiny helps to induce groupthink conditions at 
the outset and to exacerbate consensus-seeking tendencies once established.”) (citing Marlene E. 
Turner & Anthony R. Pratkanis, Twenty-Five Years of Groupthink Theory and Research: Lessons from 
the Evaluation of a Theory, 73 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 105, 106 (1998); IRVING 
L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 7–9 (2d ed. 1982); IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 3–9 (1972)). 
 110. See Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL L. REV. 1339, 1352 
(noting that Jeremy Bentham recognized “the more strictly we are watched, the better we behave”) 
(citing JEREMY BENTHAM, FARMING DEFENDED, IN 1 WRITINGS ON THE POOR LAWS 276, 277 
(Michael Quinn ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (1796)); Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive 
Accountability, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 625, 629–30 (2010) (“Psychological research on accountability 
reveals that individuals who believe they will be held accountable generally reach better-reasoned 
decisions.”) (citing Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of 
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999)); Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as 
Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617, 668–72 (2010). 
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power.
111
 As Moynihan argued, the more information officials conceal or 
restrict, the more power they wield.
112
 Conversely, the more powerful an 
official becomes, the more dependent she becomes upon secrecy—or, at 
the very least, the more entitled to secrecy she perceives herself to be.
113
 
Max Weber famously noted that the same is true of organizations, which 
tend to amass power by acquiring secrets.
114
  
Concerns about illegal secrets are of great consequence with respect to 
this power-enhancing rationale too. The power that flows from the ability 
to keep secrets includes a greater ability to conceal one’s excesses and 
abuse of that power.
115
 This danger is not simply about the opportunities 
for abuse; there is also a danger in the message that secrecy sends. 
Freedom from scrutiny suggests to secret holders that they possess 
unchecked power, perhaps suggesting that they are beyond reproach, or 
worse, above the law.  
Scholars and public officials also frequently argue that government 
secrecy breeds the public’s distrust and degrades democracy by fomenting 
cynicism about government.
116
 As one scholar has noted, “secrecy 
operates to alienate—to create subjective distance between—the secret 
keeper and the one from whom the secret is kept.”117 In the public sphere, 
this distancing damages democracy not only by putting more unchecked 
power in the hands of government officials, but also by increasing citizen 
skepticism and apathy about public affairs. As the Judiciary Committee 
Report accompanying the Freedom of Information Act noted, 
 
 
 111. Pozen, supra note 19, at 278; MOYNIHAN, supra note 5, at 73 (“Secrets become 
organizational assets, never to be shared save in exchange for another organization’s assets.”). 
 112. MOYNIHAN, supra note 5, at 169. 
 113. Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 885 (stating that “information, and the control over its flow, is 
power”). 
 114. Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 885–86 (citing MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 233 (H. 
Gerth & C. Mills eds. 1946), quoted in B. LADD, CRISIS IN CREDIBILITY 216–17 (1968)). 
 115. See Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 13 (describing secrecy as “a source of power and an 
efficient way of covering up the embarrassments, blunders, follies and crimes of the ruling regime”); 
DAVID WISE & THOMAS B. ROSS, THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT 224 (1964) (describing how U.S. 
intelligence agencies’ power to engage in covert actions insulates such agencies from outside scrutiny 
of whether such activities are “necessary or even legal”).  
 116. See Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 886; Pozen, supra note 19, at 279. As Sen. John McCain 
stated in 2003: “Excessive administration secrecy . . . feeds conspiracy theories and reduces the 
public’s confidence in government.” Michelle Mittelstadt, Senators Fault Secrecy in Sept. 11 Probes, 
Dallas Morning News, May 23, 2003. President Richard Nixon similarly noted in 1972: “When 
information which properly belongs to the public is systematically withheld by those in power, the 
people soon become ignorant of their own affairs, distrustful of those who manage them, and—
eventually—incapable of determining their own destinies.” 37 Fed. Reg., vol. 37, no. 48 (Mar. 10, 
1972), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-11652.htm. 
 117. Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 886. 
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“government by secrecy . . . breeds mistrust, dampens the fervor of its 
citizens and mocks their loyalty.”118 
Illegal secrets present a particularly acute danger to democratic 
government under this rationale as well. Such secrets confirm the worst 
suspicions of the public: that government officials operate under another 
set of rules and that government officials are inclined to deceive. For this 
reason, contrary to prevailing wisdom, shallow secrets can, as a practical 
matter, be just as dangerous as deep secrets. Shallow secrets concealing 
illegal or potentially illegal government conduct have the capacity to 
powerfully induce public apathy and cynicism at the expense of 
democratic participation. The public’s awareness that the government is 
withholding information about its potential wrongdoing, often with the 
sanction of deferential courts, can induce a sense of apathy about the 
public’s capacity to exercise meaningful checks on government 
wrongdoing. 
Some scholars, however, have expressed skepticism of the capacity of 
transparency norms under any circumstances to produce an informed and 
engaged citizenry capable of holding the governors accountable.
119
 These 
concerns are amplified when the disclosure of significant information 
about government misconduct is met with citizen inaction or apathy―as 
one might fairly characterize, for example, the prevailing public reaction 
to disclosures of illegal secrets involving CIA torture.
120
 But disclosure of 
government misdeeds need not provoke immediate and responsive public 
action in order to serve democratic ends. 
As Seth Kreimer and others have persuasively argued, the disclosure of 
government information to the public fosters democratic participation and 
 
 
 118. S. REP. NO. 813, at 45 (1965), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foialeghistory/ 
S.%20Rep.%20No.%2089-813%20(1966%20Source%20Book).pdf; see also Richard Gid Powers, 
Introduction to MOYNIHAN, supra note 5, at 58 (“What secrecy grants in the short run—public support 
for government policies—in the long run it takes away, as official secrecy gives rise to fantasies that 
corrode belief in the possibilities of democratic government.”). 
 119. Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Barry R. Rubin, A Proposal for a Comprehensive Restructuring of the 
Public Information System, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1, 33 (“[E]ducating the citizenry about the functions of 
government is a very idealistic and probably unattainable goal.”); Mark Fenster, Disclosure’s Effects: 
Wikileaks and Transparency, 97 IOWA L. REV. 753, 801, 807 (2012) (suggesting that the lack of a 
“discernible movement to change existing military engagements or foreign policy in the period 
following the WikiLeaks disclosures” discredits the assumption underlying transparency norms that 
disclosure of government information will “necessarily transform the United States or any Western 
democracy into a model of popular deliberation, participatory decision making, and perfect 
governance”). 
 120. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1014–15 (2008) (noting that critics have “lamented that even where FOIA 
requests disclose abuses, disclosures have scant impact; revelation has not been followed by 
repudiation”).  
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accountability through “gradual and cumulative momentum” which over 
time can catalyze responses to government overreaching and ultimately 
effect change.
121
 The argument for transparency in this regard is not that 
discrete disclosures result in public knowledge that then translates into 
specific acts of citizen-driven accountability directed at particular state 
action, though that certainly can occur and is a positive outcome when it 
does. The point is broader—for the public to believe in its own power 
within democracy, secrecy, and in particular illegal secrets, must be kept 
to a minimum. 
B. Authoritative Visions of Truth 
In addition to the long-standing rationales justifying transparency in 
government, additional reasons in the realm of shallow secrets warrant 
particular skepticism of government claims that it may conceal whether it 
has violated the law. In 1979, Justice William Brennan described in his 
dissenting opinion in Herbert v. Lando
122
 the ways in which the First 
Amendment “foster[s] the values of democratic self-government.” In 
doing so, he made an important observation: “[t]he First Amendment bars 
the state from imposing upon its citizens an authoritative vision of 
truth.”123 The question in Herbert involved defamation and Justice 
Brennan’s characterization described the public’s role in sifting out truth 
from falsehood.
124
 But this language also aptly captures a danger posed by 
government information control when illegal secrets are at issue—the risk 
that government will manipulate both secrecy and leaking to perpetuate a 
distorted view of the State.  
Government officials regularly attempt to control the public narrative 
regarding contested and controversial national security policy—whether 
detention and interrogation policy, the use of unmanned drones to target 
and kill suspected terrorists abroad, or the NSA’s massive, warrantless, 
electronic surveillance program—by successfully resisting disclosure of 
information to the public with the sanction of deferential courts.
125
 But at 
the same time, the government sculpts public knowledge about these very 
same activities through strategic leaks of classified information.
126
  
 
 
 121. Id. at 1064; Schauer, supra note 110, at 1344–45. 
 122. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 184 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 184–85. 
 125. See infra Part V. 
 126. As others have noted, however, the role of government leaking in democracy is complex and 
can serve a variety of goals and produce a variety of outcomes including some arguably healthy for 
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To impose an “authoritative vision of truth,” the government regularly 
attempts to quash dissent and discourage the dissemination of information 
inconsistent with its message. To accomplish this end, it has selectively 
punished unauthorized disclosures of government information through 
aggressive prosecutions of government leakers under the Espionage Act.
127
 
It has also selectively enforced agencies’ pre-publication review rules128 as 
a way of thwarting former government employees from publicly revealing 
information that is inconsistent with the government’s official account of 
its policies or actions.
129
  
These forms of information control invariably privilege government-
controlled narratives regarding executive misconduct and abuse, 
 
 
democracy. See, e.g., Affidavit of Max Frankel, United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (No. 71 Civ. 2662), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/ 
part1/frankel.html (affidavit filed by New York Times Washington Bureau Chief Max Frankel in the 
Pentagon Papers case contending that absent leaking, “there could be no adequate diplomatic, military 
and political reporting of the kind our people take for granted, either abroad or in Washington and 
there could be no mature system of communication between the Government and the people”); 
Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Role of News Leaks in Governance and the Law of Journalists’ 
Confidentiality, 1795–2005, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 425, 476, 469–83 (2006) (contending that though 
leaks play a role in political maneuvering and manipulation, they also help “facilitate governance by 
supplementing the formal channels of organizational and inter-organizational communication” 
allowing government officials to bypass political obstacles that may make internal communication 
networks inadequate and permitting whistleblowers to serve an important and valuable checking 
function when internal communication and accountability mechanisms fail); see also David E. Pozen, 
The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013). 
 127. See Mattingly & Nichols, supra note 91. 
 128. Pre-publication review is the process by which the CIA, as well as other intelligence 
agencies, require employees to sign employment contracts requiring them to seek formal agency 
approval prior to writing books, op-eds, or other public accounts of their government service. John 
Hollister Hedley, Reviewing the Work of CIA Authors: Secrets, Free Speech, and Fig Leaves (May 8, 
2007, 8:56 AM), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v41i 
3a01p.htm.  
 129. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Snepp v. United States, a case in which the 
Supreme Court enforced a CIA prepublication review agreement against a former agent, such 
agreements are ripe for abuse. 444 U.S. 507, 526 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted 
the inherent risk “that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority to delay the publication of a 
critical work or to persuade an author to modify the contents of his work beyond the demands of 
secrecy.” Id. This form of government information control has received substantial deference from the 
courts. See id. at 510 (imposing penalties for former CIA agent’s violation of pre-publication review 
agreement even where the government conceded “that Snepp’s book divulged no classified 
intelligence”); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that enforcement of 
a CIA prepublication review and secrecy agreement against former agent was not a prior restraint that 
violated the First Amendment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). As a result, the government has 
been allowed to shape public debate about both patently illegal and possibly illegal government 
activities by carefully controlling public knowledge. See Sandra Davidson, Leaks, Leakers, and 
Journalists: Adding Historical Context to the Age of Wikileaks, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 27, 
38, 36–43 (2011) (citing cases illustrating “the risk of abuse by the reviewing agency” noted by Justice 
Stevens in Snepp).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/5
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suggesting, for example, that waterboarding and other abusive 
interrogation tactics effectively thwarted terrorist attacks,
130
 that drone 
strikes effectively target individuals posing an imminent threat to the 
United States with precision and little injury to innocents,
131
 and that the 
collection of mass amounts of electronic data from Americans has kept the 
country and world safe from terrorists.
132
 At the same time, the 
government denies the public facts from which the legitimacy of such 
claims and the legality of the government’s action can be fully assessed.133  
Courts grappling with government secrecy and transparency 
obligations generally have not fully accounted for the Executive’s 
dissemination of an authoritative vision of the truth. The district court that 
decided the Citizen Drone Strike Case at least recognized the problem.  
In a decision allowing the government to keep secret the purported 
legal justification for the targeted killing program, the court described the 
government’s public statements and strategic releases of information about 
the secret program as a “relentless public relations campaign” to convince 
the public of the program’s legality.134 Yet, still, the Court did not order 
the government to publicly release any information that would allow the 
 
 
 130. Critics contend that Justice Stevens’ concerns in Snepp have been borne out by recent CIA 
manipulation of the prepublication review process to restrict publication of critical accounts of CIA 
interrogation policy, while allowing agency supporters to speak freely in defense of agency tactics. See 
Steven Aftergood, Pre-Publication Review as a Secrecy Battleground, SECRECY NEWS, FAS.ORG 
(Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2011/11/prepub_review.html; Davidson, supra note 
129, at 38. 
 131. CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 12, at 59.  
 132. See Spencer Ackerman, NSA Chief Claims ‘Focused’ Surveillance Disrupted More Than 50 
Terror Plots, THE GUARDIAN (June 18, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/18/nsa-
surveillance-limited-focused-hearing; Justin Elliott & Theodoric Meyer, Claim on “Attacks Thwarted” 
by NSA Spreads Despite Lack of Evidence, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 23, 2013, 8:59 AM), 
http://www.propublica.org/ article/claim-on-attacks-thwarted-by-nsa-spreads-despite-lack-of-evidence. 
 133. Governments’ self-serving manipulation of the historical record is a theme often discussed in 
the literature on accountability for human rights violations and post-conflict transitions. See COHEN, 
supra note 4; Brian F. Havel, In Search of a Theory of Public Memory: The State, the Individual, and 
Marcel Proust, 80 IND. L.J. 605, 607–08 (2005) (arguing that government elites construct official, 
inauthentic public memories of historical events through “public law devices and statements of official 
policy” that result in a “contrived ideological account of the past” that “mask[s] contestations of that 
account”). In critiquing state secrecy from a broader perspective, scholars have acknowledged the 
Executive’s selective leaking of classified information for strategic gain. See, e.g., Kitrosser, 
Supremely Opaque, supra note 20, at 108; Henkin, supra note 25, at 278; Wells, supra note 59, at 494. 
Kitrosser, in particular, has cited the “skewing effect on public discourse” of “the executive [having] 
free reign not only to classify and selectively disclose information, but to prosecute classified 
information leaks and publications when it sees fit[.]” See Heidi Kitrosser, What if Daniel Ellsberg 
Hadn’t Bothered?, 45 IND. L. REV. 89, 109 (2011). Yet, the frequent role of illegal secrets in this 
process and the resulting impact on accountability have not been fully explored. 
 134. N.Y. Times v. DOJ, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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public to evaluate for itself the legitimacy of the government’s claims or 
the lawfulness of its actions.  
This is deeply problematic. How the government identifies targets and 
evaluates the imminence of the danger they pose, as well as whether the 
government adequately considers alternative means of neutralizing threats 
and takes adequate precautions to limit civilian harm are all relevant to 
determining whether such uses of force comply with the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution and the laws of war.
135
 Thus, although targeted 
killing by the United States is a shallow secret, the public can not fully 
assess the truth about the program,
136
 a significant threat to democratic 
accountability.  
By manipulating public opinion, the perpetuation of the government’s 
preferred account regarding controversial national security policies and 
actions also poses potential damage to important legal norms, such as the 
absolute prohibition on torture
137—the force of which depends upon state 
and public recognition of such rules as non-derogable.
138
 In other words, 
the danger of illegal secrets is not simply about the merits of particular 
disclosures; even when shallow, such secrets can play a troubling role in a 
broader contest regarding the legality and indefeasibility of executive 
power. 
C. Legitimizing Illegality 
The literature and jurisprudence addressing state secrecy has also not 
fully accounted for the capacity of shallow secrets to provide an 
imprimatur of legitimacy to controversial and potentially illegal acts 
 
 
 135. See CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 12, at 67, 75–77. 
 136. The belated release of an OLC white paper addressed to the targeted killing program in 
February 2013—which the Executive Branch long withheld from the public until it proved 
strategically advantageous to release it—actually raises more questions about the Executive’s claimed 
secret killing power than it answers. Adam Serwer, Obama Targeted Killing Document: If We Do It, 
It’s Not Illegal, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 5, 2013, 12:53 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/ 
02/obama-targeted-killing-white-paper-drone-strikes (noting after release of the white paper that the 
procedure by which the Obama Administration claims a single “well-informed high level 
administration official” can determine to put a U.S. citizen on a targeting killing list remains entirely 
secret, thus “it’s impossible to know which rules the administration has established to protect due 
process and to determine how closely those rules are followed”).  
 137. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White 
House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005) (examining absolute prohibition on torture). 
 138. See Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee 
Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 
UTAH L. REV. 345, 418 (citing “short- and long-term consequences of illegality” as threats “to 
constitutional government and our democracy [and] law and order more generally”). 
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shielded by state secrecy. This legitimizing potential of secrecy has both 
practical and symbolic characteristics.  
As a practical matter, secrecy can immunize legally questionable 
executive conduct from public challenge and legal rebuke with 
repercussions for public perception and acceptance of the conduct 
concealed. As demonstrated by the post 9-11 litigation challenging 
extraordinary rendition,
139
 warrantless wiretapping,
140
 and the targeted 
killing of U.S. citizens abroad,
141
 government secrecy claims have the 
capacity to extinguish legal challenges alleging government abuse and 
wrongdoing. By thwarting judicial review and simultaneously stymying 
the public’s ability to see and check executive misconduct, secrecy allows 
potentially unlawful government conduct to continue without testing, and 
past wrongs to fade into history without public condemnation and 
accountability.
142
 
Secrecy can, of course, increase the public’s skepticism about 
government policies and tarnish an Executive’s reputation irrespective of 
whether critics establish the illegality of the underlying conduct, as 
demonstrated by the public reaction to the rampant secrecy of the Bush 
Administration.
143
 But even when public skepticism increases, secrecy 
may still operate to legitimatize illegal or legally questionable conduct by 
the government such as torture and extrajudicial killing. That is, when 
legally questionable government conduct surfaces enough that the public 
is aware of it while the government still obscures facts necessary to assess 
the legality and propriety of the conduct concealed, the public may 
perceive the government’s actions as acceptable because they are beyond 
the reach of public inquiry or censure.  
Behavioral research provides a basis for this concern. John Jost and 
other leading social psychologists have documented the strong tendency of 
individuals to “defend and justify the social status quo,” which they 
 
 
 139. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300, 304 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 140. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013) (holding that plaintiffs lacked 
standing to challenge the legality of the NSA’s warrantless electronic surveillance program because 
they could not prove that they were actually subject to surveillance given the program’s secrecy and 
because they did not show that they faced a “threatened injury” of surveillance in the future).  
 141. Al–Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting government’s invocation 
of the state secrets privilege in support of motion to dismiss challenge to placement of U.S. citizen on 
CIA “kill list,” but dismissing case on standing and political questions grounds). 
 142. Chesney, supra note 17, at 1269 (arguing that the state secrets privilege has the practical 
effect of preventing courts from determining the legality of challenged executive conduct, denying 
courts the opportunity of “potentially intervening to prevent further unlawful conduct”). 
 143. See supra notes 74–76. 
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characterize as “system justification theory” or “status quo bias.”144 While 
scholars and theorists often utilize system justification theory as a means 
of examining or explaining groups’ acceptance of social inequality, a 
small number of studies have also addressed the effect in regard to public 
acceptance of government policies or political outcomes.
145
 
Significantly, researchers have tested this theory in the context of 
torture and concluded that “[p]resenting torture as a status quo practice 
enhances its support and justifications” among the public.146 The authors 
of that study explain that the results of their research show “the power and 
reach of describing actions as business as usual.”147 Further illustrating the 
power of the status quo, the extraordinary secrecy and strategic leaks 
surrounding the Obama Administration’s targeted killing program have, in 
combination, helped garner extensive public support for the lethal 
targeting of terrorists,
148
 even though the public has not had access to the 
full and official legal justification for the government’s claimed killing 
power, nor to information related to the program’s efficacy and human 
costs. Indeed, advocates have expressed concern that the public has 
already accepted the lethal targeting of suspected terrorists through drone 
strikes abroad as the norm.
149
  
There is also reason to fear that excessive state secrecy helps to 
legitimize patently illegal conduct like torture. For example, recent polling 
research suggests that since 9-11, the American public has grown 
increasingly accepting of torture and receptive to arguments about its 
necessity in particular circumstances.
150
 While it is difficult to know 
 
 
 144. See, e.g., John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence 
of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 912 (2004); Gary 
Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal 
Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1119, 1160 (2006). 
 145. Blasi & Jost, supra note 144, at 1132–34, 1143 (describing study showing public support for 
eventual winner of an election increased once the candidate’s success appeared likely and another 
study showing that students voiced greater opposition to maintaining all-Black colleges after the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education than prior). 
 146. See Christian S. Crandall, et al., Status Quo Framing Increases Support for Torture, 4 SOC. 
INFLUENCE 1, 6 (2009). 
 147. Id. at 6–7. 
 148. See CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 12, at 69–70. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See Jim Lobe, U.S.: Poll Tracks Shifts in Public Attitudes Since 9/11, INTER PRESS SERV. 
(Sept. 11, 2011), http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/09/us-poll-tracks-shifts-in-public-attitudes-since-9-11/; 
Forcing Policy Attitudes Now Driven by 9/11 and Iraq: Eroding Respect for America Seen as Major 
Problem, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 18, 2004), http://www.people-press.org/2004/08/18/foreign-
policy-attitudes-now-driven-by-911-and-iraq/; Public Remains Divided Over Use of Torture, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.people-press.org/2009/04/23/public-remains-divided-
over-use-of-torture/; Ten Years After 9/11: United in Remembrance, Divided over Policies, PEW 
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why—and many factors, including the widespread, permissive treatment 
of torture in popular culture may play a role in this development—the role 
of secrecy in allowing information about the United States’ use of torture 
to remain hidden from the public, devoid of public condemnation and 
accountability, may well contribute to acceptance of the practice as the 
status quo. 
In addition, but relatedly, as a symbolic matter, secrecy has the power 
to elevate the perceived importance of concealed information with the risk 
of bestowing unlawful state action with the appearance of legitimacy. As 
historian Luise White has argued, secrecy not only withholds information, 
it “valorize[s]” it.151 White explains that secrets “signal that what has been 
declared secret . . . is more significant than other stories and other ways of 
telling.”152 Indeed, because of the aura and allure of secrecy, in classical 
times, many deemed state secrets as symbolic of a ruler’s dignity and 
righteousness.
153
 
This legitimization argument may seem counterintuitive. How can 
secrecy legitimize acts that are unknown because they are concealed? 
While it is true that secrecy’s legitimizing potential would obviously not 
operate with respect to deep secrets, which the public does not know exist, 
the same is not true of shallow secrets. Secrecy can prevent the public 
from knowing the details of illegal secrets such as those involving torture, 
but although “[s]ecrecy and lies conceal, they camouflage . . . they 
certainly don’t hide everything.”154 That is, when the government is 
accused of patently unlawful conduct, and its response is not an 
impassioned denial, but rather, “it’s a secret,” the practical effect may be 
that the public, knowing it does not have all the facts, still deduces that the 
government’s policy must be important and valuable—or, at the least 
unassailable—because it is being kept secret.  
Put another way, because secrecy is both reflective of power and 
operates as power, it has the potential to tip the scale in favor of the 
Executive with respect to normative judgments about the necessity, 
legitimacy, and desirability of the conduct concealed.
155
 The legitimizing 
 
 
RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.people-press.org/2011/09/01/united-in-remembrance-
divided-over-policies/. 
 151. Luise White, Telling More: Lies, Secrets, and History, 39 HIST. & THEORY, Dec. 2000, at 11.  
 152. Id. at 15. 
 153. See HOFFMAN, supra note 35, at 11. 
 154. White, supra note 151, at 15.  
 155. See Paul Gowder, Secrecy as Mystification of Power: Meaning and Ethics in the Security 
State, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 1, 11 (2006) (describing secrecy as the “mystification of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1132 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:1099 
 
 
 
 
capacity of secrecy should produce great concern about the role of illegal 
secrets in our government.  
D. The Case for Illegal Secrecy Examined 
Though the justifications for secrecy are strong when certain national 
secrets are at issue, like those implicating military strategy, diplomacy, or 
the names of covert intelligence sources, the rationales lose force when 
illegal secrets are at issue. For example, a common justification for 
government secrecy is the foil to the “bad policy” rationale for 
transparency: the concern that over-exposure of government conduct to 
outside scrutiny degrades government deliberation and decision-making.
156
 
Scholars have critically examined the claim that the Executive needs 
secrecy in order to promote candid advice and discussion during internal 
deliberations, and there is reason to reserve judgment on whether 
confidentiality in fact produces better decisions.
157
 At the same time, 
others have recognized—including the U.S. Supreme Court in United 
States v. Nixon,
158
 when addressing executive privilege asserted to conceal 
recordings of the President’s conversations—that in some contexts, public 
scrutiny might make it harder for well-meaning officials to do their jobs 
effectively.
159
 In fact, members of the Founding Era generation embraced 
this view in defending the secret drafting of the Constitution.
160
  
The problem with this rationale, however, is that its value varies 
depending upon whether the subject concerns secret government 
deliberation with law-abiding and legitimate ends or deliberation aimed at 
or tainted with lawlessness. Indeed, in other contexts, the law recognizes 
that the prospect of secrecy enabling or shielding illegality warrants an 
 
 
power” or the act of deceiving others “into believing that a state which was chosen, and may be 
resisted, is actually natural and fixed”). 
 156. See Pozen, supra note 19, at 277.  
 157. Lee, supra note 109, at 242 (“[I]t is simply unclear whether, or to what extent, confidentiality 
leads to better presidential decisions.”).  
 158. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (“Human experience teaches that those 
who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for 
appearances . . . to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.”). But see Lane et al., supra note 75, 
at 744 (critiquing the Court’s reliance upon this rationale when recognizing executive privilege). 
 159. Schauer, supra note 110, at 1349–50, 1352 (citing the prospect of televised Supreme Court 
arguments as an example of transparency as “populism in its pejorative sense, creating a decision-
making environment in which the lowest common denominator dimensions of widespread public 
involvement would cause bad arguments to drive out good ones”). 
 160. See HOFFMAN, supra note 35, at 21 (quoting Alexander Hamilton as stating “[h]ad the 
deliberations been open while going on, the clamours of faction would have prevented any satisfactory 
result. Had they been afterwards disclosed, much food would have been afforded to inflammatory 
declamation”). 
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exception to confidentiality norms otherwise premised upon the notion 
that confidentiality produces better deliberation. 
For example, in the context of the attorney-client privilege, courts have 
long recognized secrecy’s benefits, similarly acknowledging that 
confidentiality enhances the quality of deliberation by “encourage[ing] full 
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients” including 
about past wrongdoing.
161
 Yet, courts have also recognized that the value 
of this rationale diminishes as a justification for secrecy “where the 
desired advice refers not to prior wrongdoing, but to future 
wrongdoing.”162 Indeed, the underlying rationale for the crime-fraud 
exception to that privilege is a concern that secrecy should not encourage 
or serve lawless ends.
163
  
Similarly, even while recognizing secrecy’s capacity to enhance 
Executive deliberation and extending considerable deference to a 
coordinate branch,
164
 the Supreme Court in Nixon concluded that 
executive privilege must be qualified where the information sought to be 
exposed related to an active criminal prosecution.
165
 Although the Court 
recognized the value of the deliberation rationale, it carried less weight 
when criminal conduct was at issue.
166
  
Consistent with this doctrine, it may be appropriate to provide some 
measure of confidential space for internal government debate about how 
close to the line of illegality a considered course of action brings the 
Executive. Still, knowledge that the cover of secrecy might yield if 
officials cross that line or erroneously assess their actions to be lawful can 
 
 
 161. I thank Professor Timothy Glynn for this observation. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 
554, 562 (1989) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)); see also 5 JOHN 
HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 2291, at 14 (2d ed. 1923) (“In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal 
advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisors must be removed; 
and hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client’s consent. Such is the modern 
theory.”) But see Norman W. Spaulding, The Privilege of Probity: Forgotten Foundations of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 301 (2013) (examining the origins of the privilege 
and critiquing Wigmore’s explanation). 
 162. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562–63 (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 161, § 2298, at 573 (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 163. Spaulding, supra note 161, at 314–16 (describing how Wigmore’s concern that the secrecy of 
attorney-client deliberation would provide cover for lawlessness provided the modern justification for 
the crime-fraud exception to that privilege).  
 164. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715–16 (1974). 
 165. Id. at 707. The Court further noted that the information withheld did not relate to sensitive 
military or diplomatic matters. Id. 
 166. Id. at 712 (expressing doubt that advisers to the President would “be moved to temper the 
candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure . . . in the context of a criminal 
prosecution”). 
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serve as a powerful deterrent. In the end, if colorable evidence exists that 
public officials have engaged in illegal conduct, absent a narrow set of 
paramount national security interests as discussed in Part VI, there is little 
justification for shielding such action from the public. The interest in 
democratic accountability in such cases outweighs the risk that executive 
officials might be less candid in their internal deliberations in the future. 
Additionally, perhaps the most critical justification for state secrecy is 
the notion that our leaders must prevent the nation’s enemies from 
accessing information that will undermine our safety and security.
167
 This 
rationale is, of course, a legitimate basis for state secrets. Unfortunately, 
the government exploits the argument in order to conceal much beyond its 
legitimate security interests, including misconduct and illegality.
168
 As 
discussed in Part VI, although the law must recognize that a superseding 
national security interest could warrant the protection of illegal secrets, the 
great challenge in better theorizing the relationship between secrecy and 
illegality is ensuring that this interest does not extinguish engagement with 
illegal secrets altogether. Arguably, that outcome is now the current state 
of the law. This Article later suggests a preliminary framework for 
ensuring that national security claims do not automatically supplant 
meaningful interrogation of the lawfulness of the government conduct 
concealed.  
Another powerful justification for secrecy with important 
consequences for illegal secrets is the notion that secrecy is an aspect of 
inherent Executive power. For example, John Yoo, along with other 
prominent theorists,
169
 has argued that because “[w]ar’s unpredictability 
can demand decisive and often secret action,” the Framers intended to 
create “an executive with its own independent powers to manage foreign 
affairs and address emergencies which, almost by definition, cannot be 
 
 
 167. See generally Laura A. White, Note, The Need for Governmental Secrecy: Why the U.S. 
Government Must Be Able to Withhold Information in the Interest of National Security, 43 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 1071, 1078 (2003). 
 168. See Henkin, supra note 25, at 275–76; See Wells, supra note 110, at 635 (“The government’s 
tendency to exaggerate national security harms posed by the release of information is well-
documented.”); Wells, supra note 59, at 452–61 (describing historical examples); Jack B. Weinstein, 
The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo 
Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 92 (2008) (“The very case recognizing the ‘state secrets’ privilege 
was based on an executive impulse to conceal its own mistakes . . . .”); William G. Weaver & Robert 
M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 99 (2005) (“[I]t is now known 
that the goal of the government in claiming the privilege in [United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 
(1953), the first case to recognize the state secrets privilege] was to avoid liability and 
embarrassment.”). 
 169. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 45, 47–48 (2007). 
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addressed by existing laws.”170 Under this conception of robust executive 
power, the Executive’s decision to circumvent law in order to protect the 
nation from threats to national security is necessary, desirable, and above 
all, legal.
171
 This school of thought argues that the Executive has exclusive 
authority to balance national security with civil liberties in times of crisis 
and that the judiciary must defer to the Executive’s judgments in this 
area.
172
 With respect to secrecy, such conceptions of executive power 
would suggest either that the Executive is constitutionally justified in 
holding illegal secrets from the public or that a secret is not an illegal 
secret because the concealed conduct is lawful when carried out pursuant 
to the Executive’s exclusive authority as commander in chief.173  
A persuasive body of literature has critiqued such theories about 
exclusivist executive power on their own terms,
174
 and I will not revisit 
those debates here, except to highlight the fallibility of such arguments in 
the context of the secrecy surrounding the NSA’s massive domestic 
surveillance system, which cannot plausibly be justified by the exigencies 
of war. If such theories were to govern, notwithstanding the Fourth 
Amendment, the Executive alone could lawfully permit the NSA’s 
surveillance far from any battlefield of millions of Americans electronic 
communications and keep its conduct secret. Such arguments would 
render the Judiciary obsolete in checking government misconduct and 
undermine the very concept of democratic and accountable government.  
IV. THE LAW OF SECRECY AND TRANSPARENCY 
Analyzing whether the law adequately interrogates and exposes illegal 
secrets requires an initial review of the constitutional and statutory law 
addressed to government secrecy and the public’s right to know. As 
 
 
 170. YOO, supra note 101, at, 112, 119–20. 
 171. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 101, at 704–11 (describing the theoretical and practical 
effect of the Bush Administration’s conception of preclusive Commander in Chief powers). 
 172. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 169. 
 173.  In a series of important articles, Heidi Kitrosser has challenged the notion that exclusivist 
visions of Executive power would justify deep secrecy, noting that the threat to democratic 
accountability and structural checks in the constitutional order require that executive secrets be 
shallow and politically checkable. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Kitrosser’s work does 
not examine in depth the problem I seek to highlight here—shallow secrets that insulate government 
wrongdoing from public accountability.  
 174. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman, supra note 101; Fionnuala Ni Aoláin, Terror Conflated?, 25 
CONST. COMMENT. 131 (2008) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE 
BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY AND THE COURTS (2007)); see also Kitrosser, Supremely Opaque, 
supra note 20, at 84. 
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described next, the relevant law recognizes the central role in democracy 
of citizen-driven checks on government misconduct. 
A. Information Access and the Constitution 
The extent to which the Constitution requires government transparency 
and public access to government information remains a relatively unsettled 
area of constitutional law. The Constitution does not expressly protect a 
public right to access government information or to know what the 
government is doing.
175
 Theorists, beginning most famously with 
Alexander Meiklejohn, have long suggested, however, that the First 
Amendment’s primary purpose is to ensure that the public can make 
informed judgments and meaningfully self-govern.
176
 Under this view, the 
express guarantees of the First Amendment might imply a right to 
government information in order to promote informed deliberation and 
public participation in democracy.
177
  
Other theorists, chief among them Vincent Blasi, have argued that the 
primary function of the First Amendment is to provide a check on 
government abuse and misconduct.
178
 Under Blasi’s “checking theory” of 
the First Amendment, speech relating to “official misconduct,” “abuse of 
power,” and “breaches of trust by public officials” should receive the 
greatest constitutional protection.
179
 According to Blasi, fostering this 
citizenry-driven check was likely the concern “uppermost in the minds of 
the persons who drafted and ratified the First Amendment.”180 
Both theories provide support for the notion that the Constitution 
protects the public’s right to access government information and therefore 
limits state secrecy. As a general matter, however, courts have not 
recognized this sort of First Amendment right to access secret government 
 
 
 175. Kielbowicz, supra note 126, at 430, 486 nn.400–03; Henkin, supra note 25, at 273. 
 176. Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889, 889–90 (1986) 
(critiquing Alexander Meiklejohn’s self-governing theory) (citing A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND 
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24–27 (1948)); Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due Process 
as a Source of Constitutional Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247, 253–54 
(2005); Schauer, supra note 110, at 1349. 
 177. See Eugene Cerruti, “Dancing in the Courthouse”: The First Amendment Right of Access 
Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 289 (1995) (“Although Meiklejohn did not directly 
address rights of access to government information, his principles of self-governing democracy have 
proven seminal to the development of such putative rights”). 
 178. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. 
J. 521, 526. 
 179. Id. at 527, 542, 601. For a critique of Blasi’s checking theory, see Martin H. Redish, The 
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).  
 180. Blasi, supra note 178, at 527. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/5
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information.
181
 There are two areas of qualified exception. The Supreme 
Court has been solicitous of the public’s ability to acquire government 
information when members of the public seek access to judicial 
proceedings
182
 and when restrictions on the press work to hinder the 
public’s ability to obtain and exchange information.183 Concerns about the 
dangers of illegal secrets resonate with the Court’s rationale in both 
categories of First Amendment cases. But when addressing the 
government’s statutory obligations regarding the release of government 
information, courts have typically not invoked First Amendment concerns, 
nor, as discussed in Part V, have they been particularly suspicious, or 
demanding in their assessments, of illegal secrets. 
1. Public Access to Judicial Proceedings 
The high-water mark in Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding access 
to government information was a case that did not directly involve 
government wrongdoing, but the Court’s reasoning nevertheless 
recognized the role of the citizenry in checking government abuse and 
overreaching. In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,
184
 the Supreme Court 
held that the First Amendment protects the right of members of the public 
to attend criminal trials in order to “give meaning to” the explicit 
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. The plurality decision 
rested heavily upon “the long history of trials being presumptively open” 
and the role of public access as an “important aspect” of the trial process 
itself.
185
 But, importantly, the decision also emphasized the broader self-
governing principles and checking functions served by government 
openness and public access to government information.  
Specifically, the Court reasoned that like public access to any public 
space, court room access allows the public “to listen, observe, and learn” 
and thereby meaningfully exercise First Amendment rights.
186
 The Court 
further noted that the public’s presence serves as a check on the judicial 
system, “enhanc[ing] the integrity and quality of what takes place” during 
trial.
187
  
 
 
 181. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering 
the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95 (2004).  
 182. Id. at 105–06. 
 183. See, e.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). 
 184. 448 U.S. 555, 556, 575–76 (1980). 
 185. Id. at 575. 
 186. Id. at 578. 
 187. Id.; see also Kitrosser, supra note 181, at 107 (arguing that the Supreme Court cited the 
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Some members of the Court seemed particularly receptive to 
recognizing a broader First Amendment right of access. Justice Brennan’s 
concurring opinion, for example, referred to the right at issue as a right to 
access “information,” not merely the right to attend “proceedings.”188 
Expressly embracing a Meiklejohn view of the First Amendment as an 
essential instrument of democracy and self-government, Justice Brennan 
reasoned that the First Amendment “has a structural role to play in 
securing and fostering our republican system of self-government.”189 In 
Justice Brennan’s view, that structural role not only promotes the robust 
public debate essential to democratic government, it presupposes an 
informed citizenry as a necessary instrument of that debate.
190
  
While both the plurality opinion and Justice Brennan’s concurrence 
thus provided a foundation for recognizing a broader constitutional right 
of public access,
191
 the Court has not embraced this view outside of 
matters involving access to judicial proceedings.
192
 Indeed, the only time 
the Court has addressed the question outside of that context, it found that 
the First Amendment did not compel a public right of access. 
Specifically, in Houchins v. KQED,
193
 decided three years prior to 
Richmond Newspapers, the Court rejected the notion that the First 
Amendment granted the press a right to access a local jail. The Court 
concluded, “[n]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or 
sources of information within the government's control.”194  
 
 
normative reasons for openness in government as a justification for finding a right to attend criminal 
trials). 
 188. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 585–86 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 189. Id. at 587–88 (citing in part ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO 
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)). 
 190. Id. at 587 (stating that “[v]aluable public debate—as well as other civic behavior—must be 
informed.”). 
 191. See Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial 
Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 944 (2006) (“There is reason to think that the broader access 
claim was on the table after Richmond Newspapers.”). 
 192. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605–06 (1982) (concluding 
that criminal trials involving certain sexual offences against minors must be presumptively open); 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (same as to jury voir dire); Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (“Press Enterprise II”) (same as to pre-trial 
criminal proceedings). The lower courts split on the issue of whether the First Amendment compels 
public access to civil immigration proceedings. See North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 
F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 
681 (6th Cir. 2002). For thorough discussions of the divergent opinions from the Third and Sixth 
Circuits on this issue, see Kitrosser, supra note 181, and Samaha, supra note 191, at 945. 
 193. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
 194. Id. at 15. Houchins, however, may be limited to its facts. See Samaha, supra note 191, at 
942–43 (noting that the Court’s decision might be dismissed on grounds that it focused on “whether 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/5
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In the lower courts, the First Amendment rarely makes an appearance 
in disputes involving access to government information. But when it does, 
courts are quick to reject claims that the First Amendment compels public 
access to government information, reasoning that Richmond Newspapers 
and its progeny were limited to judicial proceedings.
195
 And even when the 
information sought to be exposed pertains to alleged government 
misconduct, courts generally give short shrift to the First Amendment 
policies animating the Richmond Newspapers line of decisions.
196
  
The same is true of Supreme Court doctrine addressing the First 
Amendment rights of government whistleblowers. Although the Court has 
protected the right of government employees to speak as citizens, in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos,
197
 it held that “the Constitution does not insulate” 
public employees from discipline by their employers due to speech made 
“pursuant to their official duties.” The Court thereby closed the door on 
First Amendment protections for a great deal of government 
whistleblowing, irrespective of whether the statements, as in Garcetti, 
related to misconduct or potential misconduct by government officials.
198
  
2. Press Limitations as Public Information Restrictions 
Though the Supreme Court has stated that the “Constitution itself is 
neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act,”199 the 
Court has recognized the public’s interest in accessing information about 
government, albeit in an indirect and limited way. When the Court has 
struck down restrictions on the press under the First Amendment, it has 
cited the creation of an informed electorate as a primary purpose of the 
 
 
‘the press’ was entitled to greater access than others, or because the Court was placing special limits 
on judicial interference with the physical management of government facilities, particularly prisons, or 
even because the claimant relied on the First Amendment rather than a structural argument about 
democracy”) (footnotes omitted). 
 195. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1255 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1129 (1999) (rejecting First Amendment claim to access executive branch administrative 
documents). But see Samaha, supra note 191, at 944–45 n.164 (citing cases in which lower courts have 
been “willing to consider access arguments on the merits of individual cases”). 
 196. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. DOJ, 331 F.3d 918, 933–36 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting 
plaintiff public interest groups’ claim that they had a First Amendment right, pursuant to Richmond 
Newspapers, to access “the names of INS and material witness detainees, and the dates and location of 
arrest, detention, and release”). 
 197. 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
 198. Id. at 414–15. 
 199. See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 14. 
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Amendment and recognized the public’s role in checking abuse and 
government mistakes.
200
  
For example, in Near v. Minnesota,
201
 the Court noted “the primary 
need of a vigilant and courageous press” to respond to the growing 
“opportunities for malfeasance and corruption” in public life occasioned in 
part by “unfaithful officials” and “official neglect.” Similarly, in Grosjean 
v. American Press Co., the Court reasoned that “since informed public 
opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the 
suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot 
be regarded otherwise than with grave concern.”202 The Court echoed its 
conception of the First Amendment as “a powerful antidote” to 
government abuse of power in Mills v. Alabama.
203
  
Although these decisions endorse a “checking theory” of the First 
Amendment that is arguably supportive of a broader constitutional right to 
access government information, this line of cases has not influenced the 
jurisprudence addressing public access to government information based 
upon First Amendment claims any more so than the Richmond Newspaper 
line of cases. Yet, given the public’s recognized role in curbing 
government wrongdoing, a constitutional argument for exposing illegal 
secrets might find greatest support in this corner of First Amendment 
doctrine.  
3. Secrecy as Constitutional Power 
Just as the Constitution does not expressly address public access to 
government information, it also does not expressly provide for 
government secrecy.
204
 As a purely textual matter, the Constitution 
addresses secrecy only in two limited means. First, the Constitution 
provides that both chambers of Congress shall publish a journal of their 
proceedings “excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require 
 
 
 200. See, e.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1931); N.Y. Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 723–24 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The dominant purpose of the First 
Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing 
information.”). 
 201. 283 U.S. 697, 719–20 (1931). 
 202. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250. 
 203. 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“[T]he press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful 
antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for 
keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to 
serve.”). 
 204. Samaha, supra note 191, at 916. 
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Secrecy.”205 Second, the Constitution requires “a regular Statement and 
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money” to be 
“published from time to time.”206 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit has interpreted the qualified nature of the latter provision as 
authorizing “secret expenditures for sensitive military or foreign policy 
endeavors.”207 Given the limited discussion of secrecy in the Constitution, 
those who argue that the Executive has the prerogative to operate with 
robust secrecy often ground such arguments in the President’s 
constitutional authority in the area of foreign affairs and national 
security.
208
 
Courts often accept these arguments, viewing the Executive’s 
responsibility over foreign affairs and national security as providing a 
concomitant constitutional authority with respect to secrecy.
209
 Justice 
Stewart, for example, in his concurring opinion in New York Times Co. v. 
United States, while agreeing with the unanimous Court that the 
government’s attempt to restrain publication of the Pentagon Papers 
violated the First Amendment, nevertheless reasoned that the Executive 
possesses a “constitutional duty . . . to protect the confidentiality necessary 
to carry out its responsibilities in the fields of international relations and 
national defense.”210  
This rationale for Executive secrecy powers continues to have force in 
a variety of contexts. It is front and center in cases involving claims of 
executive privilege.
211
 It informs the state secrets doctrine.
212
 And, when 
the government resists disclosure of government information through 
 
 
 205. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; see also Bruce E. Fein, Access to Classified Information: 
Constitutional and Statutory Dimensions, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1985). 
 206. U.S. Const. art I, § 9, cl. 7; see Fein, supra note 205. 
 207. Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 154–60 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 208. Wells, supra note 59, at 460 (“President Ford vetoed the 1974 amendments to FOIA (which 
Congress overrode) on the basis that judicial review of classification procedures violated the 
President’s inherent, constitutional powers.”) (citing Morton H. Halperin, The President and National 
Security Information, in THE PRESIDENCY AND INFORMATION POLICY 1, 9–12 (Harold Relyea et al., 
eds. 1981)). 
 209. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (“The authority to protect 
[national security] information falls on the President as head of the Executive Branch and as 
Commander in Chief.”); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 304 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing 
“that the Executive’s constitutional mandate encompasses the authority to protect national security 
information”); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1315 (4th Cir. 1972) (reasoning that the 
“President’s constitutional responsibility for the security of the Nation as the Chief Executive and as 
Commander in Chief” includes “the right and the duty to strive for internal secrecy” consistent with 
the nation’s interest).  
 210. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729–30 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 211. Lane et al., supra note 75 (discussing executive privilege doctrine). 
 212. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875); El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 304. 
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FOIA, even though FOIA raises questions of statutory disclosure 
obligations and exemptions, the Executive’s purported constitutional 
secrecy powers often have force, as well.
213
  
In sum, although the Constitution neither speaks directly of a public 
right to government information nor of an executive right to state secrecy, 
the Constitution, nevertheless, informs both the public’s right to know and 
the government’s right to conceal. Thus, constitutional principles and 
doctrine inevitably play a role in any discussion of the illegal secrecy 
dilemma even within the subconstitutional legal systems that largely 
regulate government secrecy in the United States.
214
  
B. Secrecy by Statute 
In enacting FOIA in 1966, Congress responded to what it viewed as the 
Executive’s long history of improperly denying the public access to 
information about the government by mandating public disclosure of most 
government records.
215
 In doing so, Congress recognized that the statute 
would give meaning to the First Amendment rights of free speech and a 
free press.
216
 Scholars have accordingly recognized FOIA as a statute with 
“constitutional resonance.”217  
Although Congress’s primary goal in enacting FOIA was to ensure an 
informed citizenry capable of holding “the governors accountable to the 
governed,”218 it also recognized the government’s legitimate interest in 
keeping certain information secret. The statute thus provides nine statutory 
exemptions—protecting a range of content from classified information to 
certain law enforcement records—from the requirements of public 
disclosure.
219
 Nevertheless, FOIA purports to embrace an overriding 
 
 
 213. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. DOJ, 331 F.3d 918, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting 
FOIA request seeking information about post 9-11 detention of immigration detainees and citing in 
part the Executive’s constitutional role in “protecting national security”). 
 214. See Kreimer, supra note 120, at 1047; Samaha, supra note 191, at 960. 
 215. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), superseded by 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1966) & 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(4)(B) (1966). 
 216. FOIA’s legislative history cites favorably the view of the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors that “[t]he right to speak and the right to print without the right to know are pretty empty.” 
H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 2 (1966). 
 217. See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Commentary, Freedom of Information and the First Amendment 
in a Bureaucratic Age, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 835, 837 (1983) (“Arrangements for the exercise of popular 
control are necessary, and such arrangements, because they bear so directly on the public’s power to 
control its governors, have a constitutional resonance, though they may be but statutes in form.”). 
 218. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 938; NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 
214, 242 (1978).  
 219. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1) to (b)(9) (2014). 
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policy of transparency with a presumption in favor of public access.
220
 The 
withholding of government information is meant to be the exception to the 
general rule of disclosure and the government therefore bears the burden 
of demonstrating that documents fall within specific statutory exemptions 
and therefore may be withheld.
221
  
Although FOIA’s legislative history reflects Congress’s concerns about 
secrecy concealing government misconduct,
222
 the statute itself does not 
speak to the question of whether the government may conceal its unlawful 
acts. Similarly, in 1974, when Congress amended FOIA after Watergate to 
require greater judicial oversight over government secrecy claims,
223
 it did 
not expressly address the government’s ability to withhold illegal secrets. 
Nevertheless, the FOIA and its amendments intended to shift control over 
public access to government information from the Executive to the other 
branches of government. Congress tasked the courts with enforcing the 
public’s statutory right to know. 
Although Congress assigned courts the obligation of regulating FOIA’s 
disclosure framework, when national security is invoked, the government 
still effectively controls disclosure of information about its activities. In 
the national security context, courts defer nearly wholesale to the 
Government’s claimed need for secrecy, even where the secret conceals 
illegal activities in which the government has no authority to engage.
224
  
This deference to the government’s national security claims is part of a 
larger pattern in national security litigation of judges deferring based upon 
separation-of-powers principles to the factual judgments of the executive 
branch—what Robert Chesney has critiqued and characterized as “national 
security fact deference.”225 It may also be the inevitable result, however, of 
Congress directing courts in FOIA litigation to grant “substantial weight” 
 
 
 220. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965); see also Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360–
61 (1976) (stating that FOIA reflected “a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless 
information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 
3 (1965)); U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991) (noting FOIA mandates a “strong 
presumption in favor of disclosure”). 
 221. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
 222. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 6 (1966) (“Historically, Government agencies whose mistakes 
cannot bear public scrutiny have found ‘good cause’ for secrecy.”); id. at 9 (explaining that national 
security exemption would not be governed by a “public interest” standard because “[n]o Government 
employee at any level believes that the ‘public interest’ would be served by disclosure of his failure 
and wrongdoings”). 
 223. Halstuk, supra note 71, at 92. 
 224. See infra Part IV. 
 225. Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2009).  
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to affidavits from government officials explaining why documents fall 
within a specific statutory exemption from disclosure.
226
  
In enacting that provision, Congress surely sought to protect the 
Executive’s need to keep legitimate information posing a threat to national 
security and other exempt information secret. But Congress did not intend 
for courts to defer wholesale to the Executive in assessing state secrecy. In 
fact, Congress overruled the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, EPA v. 
Mink,
227
 which held that FOIA courts were not authorized to review in 
camera information the government withheld on the basis of national 
security classifications. Responding to that decision a year later in the 
1974 FOIA amendments, Congress “increase[d] the authority of the courts 
to engage in a full review of agency action” with respect to classified 
information, signaling its intent that courts “examine the contents of the 
records themselves.”228 In fact, Congress was so intent on an active 
judicial role in regulating public access to government information that 
when President Ford vetoed the 1974 FOIA amendments largely because 
of this provision,
229
 it overrode the veto.
230
 
Following this history, a substantial literature has criticized the 
excessive judicial deference to the Executive that occurs under FOIA, 
particularly in matters involving national security.
231
 Scholars have 
persuasively noted that courts are quick to defer to the government’s 
withholding of information based upon asserted threats to national security 
because of an internalized, unproven assumption that the judiciary is ill-
equipped to assess the impact of information disclosures.
232
 That 
assumption is worthy of some skepticism, particularly in the realm of 
 
 
 226. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (2014); Carney v. DOJ, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 227. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). 
 228. H.R. REP. NO. 93-876, at 7 (1974), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/ 
foialeghistory/H.R.%20Rep.%20No.%2093-876%20(Mar.%205,%201974).pdf. 
 229. Message from the President of the United States vetoing HR 12471, H.R. Doc. No. 93-383, at 
36243 (Nov. 18, 1974). 
 230. 120 CONG. REC. H10864–H10875 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1974); 120 CONG. REC. S19806–
S19823 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974). 
 231. See generally Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV. 845, 847, 854 (2006) (criticizing “extreme judicial deference” to government secrecy 
claims in national security matters); Pozen, supra note 19, at 305, 323–38 (noting that courts “virtually 
rubber-stamp” FOIA denials based upon national security exemptions); Fuchs, supra note 108, at 132 
(“[T]he judiciary has largely failed to accept its critical role of monitoring and limiting secrecy.”); 
David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 
115 YALE L.J. 628, 631–32 (2005) (describing judicial deference under FOIA as “deeply susceptible 
to abuse and overbreadth”).  
 232. See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 MO. L. REV. 903, 906 (2004) 
(relying upon social science research regarding the psychology of risk assessment and the psychology 
of accountability to argue that judges’ ability to assess national security threats is often undervalued).  
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illegal secrets, given the numerous, high-profile government secrets later 
exposed as illegitimate.
233
  
V. SECRECY AND THE JUDICIAL CHECKING FUNCTION 
As a general matter, courts have not viewed secrecy concealing illegal 
conduct as troubling. Within FOIA, Congress did not directly address in 
whether the government may conceal unlawful acts.
234
 But it has made 
clear within statutes granting the Executive statutory secrecy privileges 
that the intelligence agencies must comply with the Constitution and laws 
of the United Sates.
235
 Even so, courts have treated illegal secrets 
permissively, refusing to probe meaningfully whether the secrecy 
exemptions granted by Congress presuppose the Executive’s compliance 
with other law.
236
  
In declining to second-guess illegal secrets, courts frequently rely upon 
CIA v. Sims,
237
 a 1985 decision of the Supreme Court involving the CIA’s 
extensive medical and psychological experimentation on human subjects 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Sims did not address whether the legality of 
the CIA’s experiments had any bearing upon the merits of publicly 
disclosing details about the program.
238
 The decision, nevertheless, has 
had enormous influence in lower court jurisprudence disclaiming judicial 
responsibility for checking illegal secrets.
239
 
 
 
 233. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 110, at 635 (“The government’s tendency to exaggerate national 
security harms posed by the release of information is well-documented.”); Weinstein, supra note 168, 
at 92 (“The very case recognizing the ‘state secrets’ privilege was based on an executive impulse to 
conceal its own mistakes . . . .”); William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive 
Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 99 (2005) (same); Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free 
Speech, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 895 (noting that former solicitor general of the United States Erwin 
N. Griswold, who litigated the Nixon Administration’s claims to prevent publication of the Pentagon 
Papers, observed later “I have never seen any trace of a threat to the national security from the 
[Papers’] publication. Indeed, I have never seen it even suggested that there was such an actual 
threat”).  
 234. The Executive Order that regulates classified information, which is frequently implicated in 
FOIA disputes, does, however, speak to illegal conduct, but only insofar as it prohibits classifications 
made in bad faith for the purpose of concealing “violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative 
error.” See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315, 15318 (Mar. 28, 2003). Even when the 
legality of underlying executive action concealed by secrecy is at issue, showing that the information 
was classified for the purpose of hiding wrongdoing is a very difficult burden.  
 235. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 403–1(f)(4) (Supp. V 2012) (mandating that the Director of National 
Intelligence “ensure [the CIA’s] compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States”). 
 236. See, e.g., Wilner v. NSA, 592 F.3d 60, 77 (2d Cir. 2009); People for the Am. Way Found. v. 
NSA, 462 F. Supp. 2d 21, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2006).  
 237. 471 U.S. 159 (1985). 
 238. Sims, 471 U.S. at 159. 
 239. See infra Part V.B. 
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A. CIA v. Sims 
In Sims, the Court held that the CIA could keep secret under FOIA the 
names of dozens of private researchers and institutions that helped the CIA 
investigate the use of “chemical, biological, and radiological materials . . . 
to control human behavior.”240 Details of the program, code-named 
MKULTRA, first surfaced in 1974, when the New York Times reported 
that the CIA had used LSD and other drugs on unconsenting and unwitting 
human subjects, at least two of whom died as a result of the 
experiments.
241
 The CIA reportedly initiated MKULTRA to keep pace 
with perceived Soviet and Chinese advancements in “brainwashing and 
interrogation techniques.”242  
When an attorney and an employee from the Ralph Nader group Public 
Citizen filed a FOIA request seeking specific information about the 
experiments, the CIA refused to disclose the identity of the researchers and 
institutions involved. The CIA invoked FOIA Exemption 3.
243
 That 
provision exempts from FOIA information that is specifically protected 
from disclosure by statute.
244
 The agency claimed that the identity of the 
researchers and institutions that engaged in the mind-control and 
interrogation research were CIA “intelligence sources” expressly 
exempted from disclosure by the National Security Act of 1947.
245
  
After the CIA appealed a district court decision ordering the agency to 
disclose the names of the researchers, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded that decision, concluding that 
the term “intelligence sources” included only persons to whom the CIA 
was reasonably required to guarantee confidentiality in order to obtain the 
relevant information.
246
 The primary issue before the Supreme Court was 
therefore a narrow one: whether “intelligence sources” included the “need 
 
 
 240. Sims, 471 U.S. at 161 (quoting CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at Book I, 389). 
 241. Seymour Hersh, Proxmire to Seek Inquiry on C.I.A. Over Role in U.S., N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 23, 
1974, at 1; Sims, 471 U.S. at 161–62. 
 242. Sims, 471 U.S. at 162. 
 243. Id. at 162–64.  
 244. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2012). Exemption 3 privileges from disclosure information 
“specifically exempted from disclosure by statute” if that statute either “requires that the matters be 
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or . . . establishes 
particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld . . . .” Id. If the 
statue was “enacted after the date of enactment of the Open FOIA Act of 2009” it must also cite 
specifically to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). 
 245. Sims, 471 U.S. at 161. The withholding provision at issue, 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1), required 
the Director of Central Intelligence to “protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure.”  
 246. Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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for confidentiality” limitation imposed by the Court of Appeals.247 The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sims, however, reached far beyond that 
narrow question, declaring that Congress granted the CIA “sweeping 
power” to protect “all sources of intelligence that provide, or are engaged 
to provide, information that the Agency needs to perform its statutory 
duties.”248 According to the Court, the term “intelligence sources and 
methods” in the CIA’s withholding statute “may not be squared with any 
limiting definition that goes beyond the requirement that the information 
fall within the Agency's mandate to conduct foreign intelligence.”249  
In adopting such a broad definition of “sources,” the Court was partly 
concerned about narrowing the pool of individuals from which the CIA 
might obtain intelligence,
250
 an arguably reasonable instinct, particularly 
viewed with today’s post-9-11 consciousness regarding the dangers of 
viewing potential intelligence with unnecessary formalism.
251
 But, as 
Justice Marshall suggested in his concurring opinion, that rationale did not 
compel the Court’s “expansive reading,”252 which degraded the judicial 
role in checking illegal secrets in several important ways.  
First, by circularly defining “intelligence sources” as sources that 
provide or are engaged to provide “information the Agency needs to 
perform its statutory duties,”253 the Court rendered itself no longer 
qualified to discern whether an individual or object should be concealed. 
Under the Court’s test, the judicial branch, constrained by separation of 
powers considerations and its limited institutional capacity to know the 
value of particular intelligence, is compelled to accede to agency claims 
regarding what it needs to know. This result is particularly dangerous 
given the government’s tendency to call “almost everything sources and 
methods.”254  
In discerning what Congress intended by the disclosure exemption for 
“sources and methods,” the Court did not consider that only five years 
earlier, Congress had publicly rebuked the intelligence agencies for illegal 
 
 
 247. Sims, 471 U.S. at 161.  
 248. Id. at 169–70. 
 249. Id. at 169. 
 250. Id. at 176–77. 
 251. See 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 108. 
 252. Sims, 471 U.S. at 191 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 253. Id. at 170. 
 254. THE CTR. FOR LAW & SEC. AT THE NYU SCH. OF LAW, SECRECY & GOV’T, AMERICA FACES 
THE FUTURE: PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF NATIONAL SECURITY 28 (2009), http://www.lawand 
security.org/Portals/0/Documents/SecrecyPrivacy.pdf (reporting comments of Washington Post Report 
Dana Priest). 
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conduct during the Church Committee hearings,
255
 and thereafter 
attempted in the very same withholding statutes to ensure the executive 
branch’s compliance with the law.256  
Second, the Court reached beyond the narrow question of the 
researchers’ status (and who or what may qualify as a source of 
intelligence more broadly) to also suggest that the CIA has sweeping 
authority to determine the methods the agency uses to gather information 
from those sources. The Court reasoned that Congress entrusted the CIA 
“with sweeping power to protect its ‘intelligence sources and methods’”257 
and that the CIA Director must be able to “shield those Agency activities 
and sources from any disclosures that would unnecessarily compromise 
the Agency’s efforts.”258 The Court’s inclusion of “methods” within its 
discussion of intelligence “sources” poses significant consequences for the 
judicial checking of illegal secrets given that how the government gathers 
intelligence—whether it is in violation of the laws of war, without a 
warrant, or through unjustified uses of force—implicates the Constitution 
and laws of the United States in a way that the sources from which the 
government obtains information may not.  
While one might dismiss the Court’s inclusion of “intelligence 
methods” as imprecise drafting or merely dicta, the Court recognized—
and appeared to accept—the prospect of entirely unauthorized and illegal 
“intelligence methods,” going out of its way to establish deference not 
only to the agency’s sources, but to its methods as well. Specifically, even 
while acknowledging that brainwashing is a “type of experimentation . . . 
expressly forbidden by Executive Order,”259 the Court nevertheless 
suggested that the Executive possessed a legitimate interest in keeping 
such illegal conduct secret. Noting its concern that disclosure of the 
research subject would enable foreign government or adversaries to infer 
the general scope and nature of the project,
260
 the Court reasoned that such 
disclosures could compromise the agency’s intelligence-gathering just as 
much as disclosing the intelligence sources’ identities.261  
In the decades that followed, numerous FOIA courts have read Sims as 
a directive to defer to government claims that their activities constitute 
“intelligence methods” deserving of secrecy irrespective of whether those 
 
 
 255. See CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5. 
 256. 50 U.S.C. § 403–1(f)(4) (Supp. V 2012). 
 257. Sims, 471 U.S. at 169 (emphasis added). 
 258. Id. (emphasis added). 
 259. Sims, 471 U.S. at 162 n.2 (citing Exec. Order No. 12333, § 2.10, 3 CFR 213 (1982)). 
 260. Sims, 471 U.S. at 177. 
 261. Id. at 176. 
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methods violate the law.
262
 To put it simply, Sims has produced a 
jurisprudence that countenances illegal secrets. 
B. Countenancing Illegal Secrets After Sims 
After Sims, courts have expressly held that the legality of government 
conduct is irrelevant to the government’s statutory disclosure obligations 
under FOIA. This doctrine has developed in a series of cases involving 
public access to information about patently illegal or legally questionable 
antiterrorism activities, including torture, warrantless electronic 
surveillance, and the targeted killing of terrorism suspects abroad.
263
 This 
Article argues that these decisions wrongly sidestep the serious threat to 
democratic accountability posed by illegal secrets and, at the very least, 
the secrecy exemptions granted by Congress must be interpreted in 
accordance with other legal constraints upon the Executive.  
1. CIA Torture 
In ACLU v. DOD,
264
 (“the Waterboarding Case”) the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit deferred to the CIA’s claim that it 
needed to keep secret information related to the use of waterboarding 
during the interrogation of suspected terrorists abroad, addressing the 
same FOIA exemption at issue in Sims, which exempts “intelligence 
sources and methods” from disclosure.265 Although the ACLU argued that 
the CIA could not avoid disclosure by characterizing illegal conduct such 
as waterboarding as a legitimate “source or method” subject to FOIA 
protection, the court disagreed, suggesting that the exemption at issue was 
 
 
 262. This may partly be due to another legacy of the decision: the Court’s embrace of the mosaic 
theory as a reason to grant deference to government secrecy claims. According to Christina Wells, the 
mosaic theory allows the government to withhold information beyond the categories of information 
delimited by Congress, based upon the claim that when such information is aggregated with other 
information it could “prove to be dangerous and must be withheld.” See Wells, supra note 231, at 854. 
Sim’s acceptance of the mosaic theory is the aspect of the decision that has received the most critical 
attention from scholars. See id.; Pozen, supra note 231. 
 263. See, e.g., ACLU v. DOJ, 681 F.3d 61, 73–74 (2012); Wilner v. NSA, 592 F.3d 60, 77 (2d 
Cir. 2009); People for the Am. Way Foundation v. NSA, 462 F. Supp. 2d 21, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2006); 
N.Y. Times v. DOJ, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); ACLU v. DOJ, 808 F. Supp. 2d 280 
(D.D.C. 2011). 
 264. ACLU, 681 F.3d at 73–74. The author litigated this matter with co-counsel before the 
Southern District of New York, as an ACLU cooperating attorney while employed as a Gibbons 
Fellow in Public Interest and Constitutional Law at Gibbons P.C. 
 265. Id. at 72–73; 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2012) (incorporating section 102A(i)(1) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 and section 6 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403–4a(d)). 
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not limited to lawful acts.
266
 Affirming the district court’s reasoning that 
“[c]ourts are not invested with the competence to second-guess the CIA 
Director regarding the appropriateness of any particular intelligence source 
or method,”267 presumably even patently illegal techniques, the Second 
Circuit concluded that “such an ‘illegality’ inquiry is clearly beyond the 
scope and purpose of FOIA.”268 The court read the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Sims regarding the agency’s need for flexibility in acquiring 
information from a variety of sources to also apply to flexibility in the 
methods of intelligence gathering.
269
  
Additionally, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that a separate 
provision of the same withholding statute limited the “methods” within the 
CIA’s mandate because it required the Director of National Intelligence to 
“‘ensure [the Agency’s] compliance with the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.’”
270
 In spite of the canon of statutory construction that 
provisions of the same statute should be interpreted in harmony with one 
another,
271
 the Court cited Sims as a “clear directive against constricting 
the CIA’s broad authority in this domain.”
272
 The Court concluded that 
“‘beyond the requirement that the information fall within the Agency's 
mandate to conduct foreign intelligence,’” under Sims, there are virtually 
no restrictions on the interrogation methods that the CIA may keep 
secret.
273
 
The Second Circuit’s refusal to examine whether Congress granted the 
CIA unreviewable authority to engage in conduct nearly universally 
considered illegal as torture,
274
 and to thus keep that conduct secret, is 
remarkable. If taken to its logical conclusion, the Court’s rationale would 
 
 
 266. ACLU, 681 F.3d at 73–74. 
 267. ACLU v. DOD, 723 F. Supp. 2d 621, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 268. ACLU, 681 F.3d at 74. 
 269. See id. 
 270. Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. § 403–1(f)(4)). 
 271. See, e.g., Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 242–44 (1972) (describing canon of 
statutory construction in pari materia as “a logical extension of the principle that individual sections of 
a single statute should be construed together, for it necessarily assumes that whenever Congress passes 
a new statute, it acts aware of all previous statutes on the same subject”) (footnote and citation 
omitted).  
 272. ACLU, 681 F.3d at 74. 
 273. Id. (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 169 (1985)). 
 274. See Janet Cooper Alexander, John Yoo’s War Powers: The Law Review and the World, 100 
CAL. L. REV. 331, 363 (2012) (noting that “[w]aterboarding . . . has been prosecuted by the United 
States as a war crime when engaged in by our adversaries or even by domestic law enforcement”) 
(citing OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF 
LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATED TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 234–35 
(2009)). 
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allow the agency to keep secret as intelligence “methods,” rape, genocide 
or any number of other blatantly illegal acts simply because the agency 
declared it a “source” or “method.” In the case of waterboarding, had the 
court even minimally probed whether Congress intended to sanction CIA 
torture as an “intelligence method,” it would have had to confront U.S. 
ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Congress’s codification 
of the absolute prohibition on torture.
275
 It also would have encountered 
considerable evidence that when Congress created the CIA in 1947, it 
never intended for the CIA to engage in patently illegal “intelligence 
methods” or to operate under a policy of self-directed lawlessness.276 
Several decades later, the Church Committee confirmed that Congress did 
not intend to create an agency above the law.
277
 Indeed, Congress has 
reconfirmed this intent when it has amended the CIA’s withholding 
statutes.
278
  
The Second Circuit’s limited analysis of Congressional intent with 
respect to CIA lawlessness is not aberrational. Other courts have exhibited 
a similar aversion to assessing the CIA’s illegal secrets. For example, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
addressed the secrecy of certain interrogation techniques and conditions of 
confinement related to the treatment of so-called “‘high value’ detainees” 
held and interrogated by the CIA at secret prisons abroad.
279
 In that case, 
also captioned ACLU v. DOD (“the CIA Interrogations Case”), the 
plaintiffs argued that after President Obama had “banned” such techniques 
in an Executive Order, the interrogation methods and conditions of 
confinement were no longer protectable “intelligence methods” because 
they were now illegal and outside the Agency’s mandate.280 The court 
rejected that argument, reasoning “there is no legal support for the 
conclusion that illegal activities cannot produce classified documents.”281 
 
 
 275. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a), (c) (2000).  
 276. OLMSTED, supra note 44, at 13. 
 277. See CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 52. 
 278. See 50 U.S.C. § 431(c)(3) (2006) (clarifying that the FOIA exemption applicable to CIA 
operational files did not apply to records containing information subject to congressional investigation 
“for any impropriety, or violation of law”); see Hannah H. Bergman, Comment, The CIA’s Public 
Operational Files: Accessing Files Exempt from the CIA Information Act of 1984 Because of 
Investigations into Illegal or Improper Activity, 3 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 99, 111 (2008) (“This 
language was meant to assure Congress that evidence of illegal activities . . . would still come to light, 
and was added over objections by the CIA . . . .”).  
 279. ACLU v. DOD, 628 F.3d 612, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
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The government’s unilateral and self-serving decision to characterize 
illegal conduct like torture as an “intelligence method,” should not 
immunize such conduct from public scrutiny. But as the D.C. Circuit 
suggested, the government might have other, legitimate grounds for 
withholding documents concealing illegality. Conceivably a document 
containing information about illegal intelligence methods might also 
contain classified information deserving of protection, such as the names 
of covert operatives or actual intelligence. But the possibility that 
legitimate classified information could be revealed through disclosure of a 
government record should not transform an illegitimate and illegal 
interrogation technique discussed in the same document into a valid 
“source or method” deserving of protection. In accordance with FOIA’s 
express language, courts routinely segregate information deserving of 
protection from that which should be disclosed.
282
 In the CIA 
Interrogations Case, the circuit court failed to explain how disclosure of 
the interrogation techniques would improperly expose other legitimate 
intelligence information that could not be segregated from disclosure.  
2. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance 
Long before Edward Snowden exposed the NSA’s massive warrantless 
collection of Americans’ phone records, courts had already deemed the 
legality of the agency’s controversial warrantless electronic surveillance 
program
283
—a portion of which President Bush acknowledged and 
referred to as the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP)—irrelevant to 
whether information about the program should be disclosed. For example 
in Wilner v. NSA,
284
 a group of attorneys and law professors representing 
Guantanamo detainees sought records from the NSA and DOJ regarding 
whether the government had intercepted communications relating to the 
representation of their clients. In response, the agencies invoked what is 
commonly known as a Glomar response, refusing to either confirm or 
deny the existence of the records on grounds that such information would 
itself reveal classified information.
285
  
 
 
 282. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) (“Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided 
to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this 
subsection.”). 
 283. 50 U.S.C. § 1801–12 (Supp. V 2012). 
 284. 592 F.3d 60, 77 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 285. Id. at 67. The Glomar doctrine is named for the D.C. Circuit Court’s 1976 decision in 
Phillippi v. CIA, a case involving records relating to the CIA’s efforts to uncover a sunken oceanic 
research vessel, the Hughes Glomar Explorer. See Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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The plaintiffs challenged that response, arguing that if any such records 
existed they “would have been obtained in violation of the U.S. 
Constitution” and thus could not be concealed.
286
 Specifically, the 
plaintiffs contended that the Glomar rationale cannot be used to “conceal 
illegal or unconstitutional activities.”
287
 But the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York refused to consider the 
legality of the NSA’s surveillance “in the context of suits seeking 
disclosure of secret records.”
288
 The court also expressed skepticism that 
the NSA’s Glomar response was designed to conceal “activities that 
violate the Constitution or are otherwise illegal.”
289
 
A similar issue arose in another FOIA suit seeking records about the 
NSA’s warrantless surveillance of Americans, People for the American 
Way Foundation v. NSA.
290
 There, a non-profit organization sought 
records from the NSA regarding the general authority and scope of the 
program and claimed, similar to the Wilner plaintiffs, that such 
information could not be concealed because the program was illegal.
291
 
The District Court for the District of Columbia declined to “grapple with” 
the legality of the program and deferred to the government’s claim that 
revealing information about NSA surveillance would reveal information 
about its signals intelligence, a legitimate method of intelligence-gathering 
capable of use in lawful contexts.
292
 While noting that the NSA’s authority 
to keep its activities secret was “not without limits,” the court did not 
consider whether information about a potentially illegal program could be 
disclosed while protecting information about otherwise legitimate 
intelligence techniques.
293
  
This distinction again drawn by a court—that the exposure of illegal 
conduct can at times reveal legitimate information worthy of protection—
is, of course, a proper consideration when courts grapple with illegal 
secrets. Unfortunately, courts often fail to provide a convincing 
 
 
 286. Wilner, 592 F.3d at 76–77. 
 287. Id. at 76. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 78. 
 290. 462 F. Supp. 2d 21, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 291. Id. at 30.  
 292. Id. at 31. 
 293. Id. In two earlier FOIA cases, the D.C. Circuit similarly reasoned that government agencies 
“may properly withhold records gathered illegally if divulgence would reveal currently viable 
information channels, albeit ones that were abused in the past.” Founding Church of Scientology v. 
NSA, 610 F.2d 824, 829 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Lesar v. DOJ, 636 F.2d 472, 483 (D.C. Cir. 
1980).  
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justification for why particular disclosures jeopardize legitimate secrets. 
For example, in People for the American Way, it is unclear why all of the 
information sought, including “the total number of individuals who have 
been the subject of warrantless electronic surveillance by the NSA in the 
United States,” would jeopardize the agency’s future use of signals 
intelligence. The Court also failed to address why legitimate secrets could 
not be segregated and responsive information released.
294
 
Of all the cases raising arguments about the legality of the NSA’s 
surveillance activities, a non-FOIA case, Terkel v. AT&T Corp.,
295
 reflects 
the greatest judicial skepticism of illegal secrets. Terkel involved a suit by 
telephone customers against AT&T for illegally disclosing their phone 
records to the NSA.
296
 The NSA intervened in order to argue that the state 
secrets privilege barred discovery as to whether AT&T provided records to 
the NSA.
297
 But the NSA also claimed that Section 6 of the National 
Security Agency Act (“NSAA”) protected the information from 
disclosure.
298
 That withholding statute contains even more expansive 
language than the statutes protecting the CIA’s “sources and methods.” It 
authorizes the agency to withhold information regarding “the organization 
or any function of the National Security Agency [and] of any information 
with respect to the activities thereof.”
299
 Although the court decided the 
case on the basis of the state secrets privilege and not the NSAA, unlike 
most of the district courts addressing illegal secrets under FOIA, the 
Terkel Court was skeptical that Congress granted the agency authority to 
keep secret even patently illegal activities. Noting its concern that the 
government’s argument if “taken to its logical conclusion . . . would allow 
the federal government to conceal information regarding blatantly illegal 
or unconstitutional activities simply by assigning these activities to the 
NSA or claiming they implicated information about the NSA’s 
functions,”
300
 the court stated it was “hard-pressed to read section 6 as 
essentially trumping every other Congressional enactment and 
Constitutional provision.”
301
  
 
 
 294. See Church of Scientology, 610 F.2d at 829 n.49 (noting the government’s obligation to 
segregate “aspects of the records” not implicating legitimate intelligence operations). 
 295. 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 905 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 296. Id. at 900. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 905. 
 299. Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. § 402 (2006)). 
 300. Id.  
 301. Id. One other court in a earlier FOIA case interpreting the same NSA withholding statute 
expressed skepticism about the withholding of illegal secrets. See Hayden v. NSA, 608 F.2d 1381, 
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These varied decisions addressed to the secrecy of the NSA’s 
surveillance activities illustrate that even when government action has 
transcended the obscurity of deep secrecy, the government still denies the 
public access to information critical for understanding and holding the 
government accountable—all with the sanction of deferential courts.
302
 
Even Terkel, which recognized the danger of reading statutory secrecy 
privileges as trumping constitutional and other statutory restraints on the 
Executive, allowed details regarding domestic NSA surveillance to remain 
shrouded in secrecy under the state secrets privilege. This NSA program 
and others thus continued virtually unchecked until a government 
contractor exposed the scope of the NSA domestic spying seven years 
later. 
3. Targeted Killing Through Drone Strikes Abroad  
The government has also resisted disclosure of information sought by 
members of the public regarding the government’s use of foreign drone 
strikes to lethally target suspected terrorists including U.S. citizens abroad. 
For example, in New York Times v. DOJ,
303
 (“the Citizen Drone Case”), 
the Obama Administration refused to disclose information sought by the 
New York Times and the ACLU regarding the legal justification for the 
government’s conclusion that it may lawfully target and kill persons 
whom it suspects of ties to Al–Qaeda, including United States citizens. 
Unlike other FOIA decisions addressing illegal secrets, in the Citizen 
Drone Case, the district court made considerable efforts to analyze the 
significant legal questions raised by the underlying government activities 
concealed by secrecy.
304
  
After an extended discussion of the due process and statutory 
constraints on the extrajudicial execution of citizens, for example, the 
court noted “legitimate reasons, historical and legal, to question the 
legality of killings unilaterally authorized by the Executive that take place 
otherwise than on a ‘hot’ field of battle.”305 But in spite of its doubts about 
 
 
1389 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (suggesting that section 6 of the NSAA would not apply to functions or 
activities that were not authorized by statute or otherwise lawful). 
 302. President Bush officially ended the deep secrecy surrounding the NSA’s warrantless 
electronic surveillance in 2005, confirming a New York Times report in a weekly radio address. See 
President’s Radio Address, WHITE HOUSE RADIO (Dec. 17, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html. Yet, the government continued to 
successfully resist disclosure of information about the program. 
 303. 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 304. Id. at 521–24. 
 305. Id. at 524. 
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the legality of the program, which the court acknowledged were not 
“straightforward,” the court nevertheless concluded that the government 
could keep secret, under a variety of statutory exemptions, all documents 
related to the Administration’s legal justification for its purported killing 
power.
306
 The court concluded that decisional law compelled that 
conclusion.
307
 District Judge McMahon noted her frustration, however, at 
what she described as the “Alice-in-Wonderland nature” of her decision.308 
She explained it as “a veritable Catch-22,” stating: “I can find no way 
around the thicket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the 
Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly lawful 
certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution 
and laws, while keeping the reasons for its conclusion a secret.”309 
This decision followed a similar 2011 decision by the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia. In ACLU v. DOJ,
310
 (“the 
Targeted Killing Case”), the district court affirmed the CIA’s Glomar 
Response to an ACLU request seeking information not only about the 
purported legal justification for the United States’ targeting killing 
program, but also about the scope of the drone program, the standards 
governing targeting decisions, the agencies involved, and the impact on 
civilians.
311
 As in the Citizen Drone Case, the court, citing Sims, rejected 
the ACLU’s claim that extrajudicial killing was outside the CIA’s mandate 
to gather intelligence.
312
 
Taken together, all of these decisions suggest that when faced with 
controversial and legally questionable government policies, courts often 
quickly defer (or in the case of the Citizen Drone Strike Case, reluctantly 
defer) to Executive branch arguments about the need to cloak in secrecy 
both the purported legal authority for their actions, as well as information 
related to the efficacy and human costs of government action. The 
unbroken cover of secrecy that results undermines democratic 
accountability—the very purpose of FOIA—and illustrates the need for a 
new approach to illegal secrets.  
 
 
 306. Id. at 524, 538. 
 307. Id. at 515 
 308. Id.  
 309. Id. at 515–16. 
 310. 808 F. Supp. 2d 280 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 311. Id. at 285. 
 312. Id. at 291–92. 
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VI. CONFRONTING ILLEGAL SECRETS 
A. Illegality Matters 
To prescribe how the law might better grapple with illegal secrets 
requires a threshold consideration of why illegality matters to the secrecy 
discussion.
313
 The themes developed earlier in this Article, and 
summarized here, help answer that question. First, the relationship 
between secrecy and illegality in American history warrants considerable 
skepticism of secrecy that conceals legally questionable government 
conduct. The track record strongly suggests a symbiotic relationship 
between government secrecy and illegality—secrecy can encourage bad 
acts while simultaneously illegal behavior seeks out secrecy to avoid 
responsibility and public censure.  
Additionally, illegal secrets undermine democratic accountability in 
particular ways. By inviting manipulative state information disclosures, 
illegal secrets distort the public’s view of the State. And such secrets, even 
when made shallow, are fraught with the risk that secrecy will legitimize 
the underlying unlawful conduct in the eyes of the public before there is an 
opportunity to debate the relevant policies or hold government actors 
accountable for unlawful acts.  
Moreover, the primary normative justifications for transparency in 
government as a general matter are particularly sensitive to the threats 
posed by illegal secrets, even if commentators do not typically discuss the 
rationales in such terms. The same is true of the self-governing and 
checking theories of the First Amendment’s role in democracy.  
All of these principles provide historical and theoretical footing for this 
Article’s primary claim: that our transparency norms and the judges 
enforcing them should be more skeptical and demanding of government 
secrecy when it conceals illegal and potentially illegal conduct by the 
Executive. Without access to illegal secrets, the public cannot hold the 
government accountable for blatant wrongdoing and ensure compliance 
 
 
 313. It is true that many of these same rationales would similarly support exposure of a wide range 
of disfavored conduct and bad acts concealed by secrecy beyond those that qualify as illegal. Indeed, 
normative justifications surely exist for exposing bad policy, misconduct, or unethical behavior that 
does not rise to the level of being illegal. This Article, however, is addressed to the particular and 
profound threat to democracy presented when the government shields unlawful conduct from the 
public: a government that operates with illegal secrets undermines the rule of law and society’s faith in 
government. 
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with clearly established law.
314
 And, as some courts have acknowledged, 
but have failed to resolve, without access to illegal secrets, the public 
cannot assess, challenge, or meaningfully debate the lawfulness of 
controversial government action—the legality of which is an open 
question.
315
  
Though identifying and grappling with illegal secrets necessarily 
complicates information-access disputes before the courts, greater 
complexity is superior to the status quo of allowing the government to 
keep its illegal action secret by default without regard to any normative 
justifications for doing so.  
B. The Proposed Framework 
Throughout this Article, the term illegal secret refers to a wide range of 
state secrets implicating concerns about government illegality. Those 
include secrets concealing patently illegal conduct, like torture, as well as 
secrets that conceal conduct that appears to, but does not definitively, 
violate established law, either because the facts related to the potential 
violation have not been established or because the lawfulness of the 
conduct at issue is an open and undecided issue—such as secrets 
concealing the government’s targeted killing and warrantless electronic 
surveillance programs. Given the ways in which each kind of secret 
undermines democratic accountability, I argue that both warrant close 
scrutiny and, in most cases, public exposure.  
Thus, under the framework proposed here, the established illegality of 
government conduct underlying a secret—such as the president’s criminal 
conduct,
316
 an intelligence agency’s use of torture,317 or military war 
crimes
318—should compel disclosure of such secrets given the irrefutable 
 
 
 314. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1064 (2008). 
 315. See id. 
 316. Indeed, the constitutional process for presidential impeachment and verdict requires 
Congress’s consideration of whether the President has committed a high crime or misdemeanor. See 
generally Jonathan Turley, Congress As Grand Jury: The Role of the House of Representatives in the 
Impeachment of an American President, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 735 (1999). Resort to that process 
could not be considered or triggered if the underlying presidential crime, whatever its character, is not 
exposed.  
 317. Torture is illegal under numerous lines of domestic and international law that bind the United 
States, including federal criminal law. See Waldron, supra note 137 (examining absolute prohibition 
on torture); Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate 
Sanctions, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1535 (2009). 
 318. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (2006) (defining conduct committed domestically or abroad that is 
prosecutable as a war crime). 
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ways in which masking such presumptive unlawfulness undermines 
democratic accountability.
319
 Only in the most pressing and exceptional 
cases, as explained more fully below, should executive claims of a 
national security priority present a paramount justification for withholding 
such information from the public.
320
 Moreover, where there is a plausible 
allegation of illegality, courts should consider whether sanctioning 
government secrecy will thwart public debate regarding the lawfulness and 
appropriateness of the conduct concealed, such that the more plausible the 
allegation of illegality, the stronger the basis for disclosure.  
In many cases, this proposed framework can be applied within FOIA’s 
existing statutory disclosure and withholding scheme, given that an 
agency’s statutory secrecy powers do not occur in a vacuum and other law 
necessarily comes to bear in delimiting the executive conduct that 
Congress deemed worthy of secrecy. For example, in the case of secret 
CIA torture, although the agency may be empowered by Congress to keep 
“intelligence sources and methods” secret through FOIA Exemption 3 and 
related withholding statutes,
321 
other acts of Congress—not to mention the 
Constitution and international law—simultaneously constrain the agency’s 
authority to engage in unlawful acts.  
Given that many withholding statutes do not precisely define the 
“methods” or other activities that an agency may keep secret, it would be 
logical for courts construing such terms to consider other law, in particular 
other acts of Congress, relevant to the question of an agency’s powers. Put 
another way, as the Terkel court suggested, it would be anomalous for 
courts to read secrecy statutes as “trumping every other Congressional 
enactment and Constitutional provision.”322  
 
 
 319. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965); see also Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360–
61 (1976) (stating that FOIA reflected “a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless 
information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 
3 (1965)); U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991) (noting FOIA mandates a “strong 
presumption in favor of disclosure”); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006); Carney v. DOJ, 19 F.3d 807, 
812 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 320. This proposition would not undermine the principle that information deserving of protection 
should be segregated from the portion of illegal secrets that should be disclosed. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) 
(2012) (“Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting 
such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection.”). 
 321. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2006) (protecting information “specifically exempted from disclosure 
by statute” if that statute either “requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner 
as to leave no discretion on the issue; or . . . establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to 
particular types of matters to be withheld”); 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (2006) (requiring the Director of 
Central Intelligence to “protect[] intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure”). 
 322. Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 905 (N.D. Ill. 2006). One other court in a earlier 
FOIA case interpreting the same NSA withholding statute expressed skepticism about the withholding 
of illegal secrets. Hayden v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 608 F.2d 1381, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (suggesting that 
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For example, in the case of torture, when Congress criminalized torture 
and made clear that the prohibition on torture is absolute, it could not have 
meant to simultaneously authorize government agencies to engage in 
torture as an acceptable “intelligence method” and privilege that conduct 
through secrecy.
323
 The Second Circuit in the Waterboarding Case 
suggested, however, that resolving the legality of waterboarding once the 
CIA claimed it was a protected “intelligence method” was unduly 
complex.
324
 According to the court, that analysis would require not only a 
determination of whether “torture” constitutes a protected method, but also 
a second-order analysis of whether the particular technique at issue itself 
qualifies as torture.  
But courts are competent to determine whether particular conduct 
concealed by state secrecy is proscribed by law, and have on occasion 
done so in FOIA suits, albeit without discussing such limitations on 
agency conduct in terms of legality. For example, federal courts have held 
that the CIA could not keep its book publishing propaganda
325
 and 
domestic law enforcement activities
326
 secret as protected “intelligence 
methods” because Congress prohibited the agency from engaging in such 
activities.
327
 Where Congress has delegated to the judiciary the authority to 
adjudicate substantive violations of a statute, such as the federal torture 
statute,
328
 it is arguably even clearer that courts are well-equipped to 
 
 
section 6 of the NSAA would not apply to functions or activities that were not authorized by statute or 
otherwise lawful). 
 323. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a), (c) (2000). 
 324. See ACLU v. DOJ, 681 F.3d 61, 74 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that such a complex illegality 
inquiry “is clearly beyond the scope and purpose of FOIA”). 
 325. See Navasky v. CIA, 499 F. Supp. 269, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that book publishing 
and propaganda could not be withheld as secret “intelligence methods” because Congress intended to 
preclude CIA participation in those activities). 
 326. See Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that domestic law 
enforcement activities could not be withheld as secret “intelligence methods” because Congress 
intended to preclude CIA participation in those activities).  
 327. The ACLU relied upon these decisions unsuccessfully in the Waterboarding Case. See Brief 
for the Plaintiffs—Appellees—Cross-Appellants, ACLU, 681 F.3d 61, 2011 WL 2441227 (June 3, 
2011). 
 328. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000). Moreover, the federal courts already assess whether particular 
methods amount to torture when they adjudicate cases by immigrants seeking relief from removal 
under the Convention Against Torture, and in fact, have a rich jurisprudence at their disposal. See 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 
1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (Dec. 10, 
1984). Article 3 of the Torture Convention prohibits states from returning a person to a country in 
which she faces a substantial likelihood of torture. Id. In 1990, the U.S. Senate ratified the Torture 
Convention. See 136 Cong. Rec. S17,486–92 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). In 1998, Congress 
implemented the nonrefoulement mandate of Article 3 of the Convention into U.S. law. See Foreign 
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2822 
(1998). 
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consider whether conduct falling within such statutes was otherwise 
intended by Congress to be concealed.  
More broadly, given FOIA’s overriding purpose of government 
accountability
329
 and its relationship to the exercise of First Amendment 
rights,
330
 one could arguably interpret the secrecy exemptions granted by 
Congress in FOIA as presupposing the Executive’s compliance with 
statutory and constitutional law. Or illegal action by the Executive might 
fairly be viewed as akin to “unclean hands” that disentitle the State from 
invoking FOIA’s disclosure exemptions.  
Although courts could effectively check illegal secrets under the 
existing statute in these ways, courts have resisted doing so. Moreover, 
many of FOIA’s existing exemptions (including Exemption 1 pertaining to 
classified material) do not direct courts to construe other statutory and 
constitutional limits upon agency conduct. For these reasons, Congress 
should consider amending FOIA to address illegal secrets directly. Indeed, 
Congress could further the goal of democratic accountability at the heart 
of FOIA by providing that the unlawfulness of secret government conduct 
creates a rebuttable presumption that a secret should be disclosed—
legislatively codifying a carve-out to government secrecy withholdings 
similar to the common law crime-fraud exception to attorney-client 
privilege that courts routinely enforce.
331
 Doing so could go a long way 
toward achieving FOIA’s purpose of “holding the governors accountable 
to the governed.”332 
A final consideration under this framework—whether assessing illegal 
secrets under FOIA’s existing exemptions or through a specific 
Congressional enactment as proposed herein—must acknowledge that a 
superseding national security interest could warrant the concealment of 
illegal secrets. Indeed, in Near v. Minnesota,
333
 the Supreme Court 
suggested that, in a very narrow set of circumstances, national security and 
wartime exigencies might even justify a prior restraint on the press, which 
would otherwise clearly violate the First Amendment.
334
 If national 
 
 
 329. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. DOJ, 331 F.3d 918, 925 (D.C. Cir. 2003); NLRB v. 
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1977). 
 330. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 23 (1966) (citing favorably the view of the American Society 
of Newspaper Editors that “[t]he right to speak and the right to print without the right to know are 
pretty empty[.]”); Freedman, supra note 217, at 836–37. 
 331.  See supra notes 159–61 and accompanying discussion. 
 332. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d, at 925; NLRB, 437 U.S. at 242. 
 333. 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).  
 334. Although the Court has never upheld such a restraint, in United States v. Progressive, Inc., a 
district court issued a preliminary injunction to enjoin a magazine from publishing an article outlining 
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security interests can theoretically supersede core First Amendment rights 
in exceptional cases, such interests necessarily might limit the public’s 
statutory right to know about illegal secrets as well. But given the threats 
to democracy presented by illegal secrets and the First Amendment 
policies served by their exposure, courts should treat such exceptions to 
disclosure as similarly exceptional.  
To that end, when a secret conceals illegal government action or there 
is evidence that a secret conceals plausible illegality, FOIA’s presumption 
in favor of disclosure should govern and courts should order the disclosure 
of illegal secrets unless the government shows that a serious threats to 
national security will occur should the secret be disclosed. Courts should 
require as much explanation regarding the illegal secret on the public 
record as possible. And even where the government demonstrates a 
legitimate need to conceal illegal secrets in the interests of national 
security, courts can still require the government to scrupulously segregate 
information that would threaten national security from information 
revealing the illegal secret to the public.
335
 
C. Overcoming Perceived Limitations of the Proposed Framework 
In arguing that the legality of secret government conduct is a vital 
consideration that must be prominent in an information-disclosure regime 
premised on the goal of democratic accountability, this Article addresses 
not only secrets suppressing patently illegal conduct, but also secrets 
concealing conduct that appears to, but does not definitively, violate the 
law. Though this latter category of secrets may appear too intractable to 
regulate, there are important reasons for including them within the 
framework proposed here. 
Specifically, when the legality of government conduct concealed by 
secrecy is a close question, the interests in disclosure can be equally strong 
as cases of clear illegality. That is, exposure of such secrets allows the 
public to assess the legitimacy and lawfulness of government action and 
force the Executive to defend its conduct and disclose the claimed 
authority for its actions.
336
 Disclosure thus allows for the debate and 
 
 
the design of the hydrogen bomb. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wisc. 
1979). 
 335. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) (“Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be 
provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under 
this subsection.”). 
 336.  In this sense, in the Citizen Drone Strike Case, the district court’s exploration and discussion 
of its concerns about the legality of the targeted killing program in the course of its decision upholding 
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exchange of ideas that is central to democracy, irrespective of whether the 
particular policy at issue is ultimately deemed lawful. 
For example, while Edward Snowden’s disclosures about the NSA’s 
massive domestic surveillance programs did not resolve the legality of 
such government action, and as of the time of this writing that issue 
remains unresolved,
337
 concerns about its legality and impact on 
Americans’ privacy have prompted what President Obama has 
acknowledged as an important debate.
338
 That debate has sparked reform 
efforts within Congress and encouraged the Executive to study the issues 
more closely and contemplate changes to the programs.
339
 But democracy 
cannot depend upon leakers alone for such important debates and checks 
on government to take place. Indeed, the NSA surveillance leaks and the 
debate that has followed vividly illustrate why courts must be suspicious 
of illegal secrets that present colorable evidence that the Executive has 
violated the law.  
Questioning whether a secret passes this threshold does not lend itself 
to a bright line rule. But even without Congress legislating a rebuttable 
presumption in FOIA that illegal secrets should be disclosed, courts can 
nevertheless better regulate this form of illegal secrets through FOIA’s 
existing provisions by, at the very least, allowing judicial doubts about the 
legality of secret executive conduct to modulate courts’ deference to the 
Executive with respect to the applicability of FOIA’s statutory 
exemptions,
340
 prompting more detailed explanations from the 
government. Doing the latter can force the Executive, without necessarily 
exposing all of the details that it wishes to conceal, to at least defend the 
lawfulness of its actions on the public record. The current approach of 
 
 
the government’s FOIA exemptions is a step in the right direction. N.Y. Times Co. v. DOJ, 915 F. 
Supp. 2d 508, 521–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The court, however, could have gone further in pushing the 
Administration to defend what the court essentially identified as a potential illegal secret. 
 337. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
 338. Adam Gabbatt, Obama Acknowledges Edward Snowden Disclosures in NSA Reform Speech, 
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2014, 1:54 PM) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/17/Obama-
acknowledges-edward-snowden-nsa-reform (reporting President Obama’s acknowledgement of 
Edward Snowden’s leaks and the importance of the debate over NSA surveillance that it sparked). 
 339. Francine Kiefer, NSA Reform? Obama Faces Headwinds in a Congress Divided on 
Surveillance Policy, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ 
DC-Decoder/2014/0117/NSA-reform-Obama-faces-headwinds-in-a-Congress-divided-on-surveillance 
-policy; Nakashima, supra note 88; Ellen Nakashima & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Shouldn’t Keep Phone 
Database, Review Board Recommends, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/world/national-security/nsa-shouldn’t-keep-phone-database-review-board-recommends/2013/12/ 
18/f44fe7c0-67fd-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html (describing recommendations of panel 
appointed by President Obama to review NSA surveillance activities).  
 340. 8 U.S.C. § 552A(1)(B) (2012). 
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treating the lawfulness of government action as irrelevant to the 
government’s secrecy privileges undermines the potential for FOIA 
contests to test and push the government to account for controversial and 
legally questionable policies—a critical part of transparency even without 
disclosure of government secrets in full.  
Moreover, assessing potential illegal secrets under the framework 
proposed here need not resolve the lawfulness of disputed government 
actions. Rather, the court’s analysis of illegal secrets could operate 
similarly to the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.
341
 In 
that setting, courts consider whether a party has established prima facie 
evidence of attorney-client communications that would assist the client in 
a crime or fraud.
342
 Such a prima facie finding does not automatically 
expose the presumptive wrongdoer to criminal punishment, damages, or, 
when the client is the U.S. government, result in nullification of the 
presumptively illegal policy—although those results might occur through 
other actions after exposure. A finding that the crime-fraud exception to 
confidentiality applies simply means that the party to the communication 
is disentitled from keeping its conduct or communication secret.  
Evaluating illegality in the context of government secrecy should work 
in the same way. A FOIA court should similarly assess whether there is 
prima facie evidence of unlawful government conduct, such that, in the 
interests of democratic accountability, the privilege and benefits of secrecy 
should yield.  
Although the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is 
not a perfect analogy for grappling with illegal government secrets,
343
 the 
example helps demonstrate the ways in which courts can and do make 
preliminary assessments of legality not for the purpose of nullifying 
 
 
 341. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).  
 342. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). But see Auburn K. Daily & S. Britta 
Thornquist, Has the Exception Outgrown the Privilege?: Exploring the Application of the Crime-
Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583 (2003) (noting that 
the quantum of proof required to establish the application of the privilege has varied by court and 
remains uncertain); Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 113–15 (2002) 
(describing the uncertain nature of the crime-fraud exception’s scope). 
 343. For example, the privilege and its underlying rationales are concerned with communications 
directed at the future commission of a crime or fraud, not records concealing illegality more generally. 
See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562–63. Moreover, the crime-fraud exception is a development of the common 
law, and application of it to statutory secrecy privileges created by Congress through FOIA and related 
withholding statutes could present separation of powers concerns. See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 
323 U.S. 490, 514 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he judicial function does not allow us to 
disregard that which Congress has plainly and constitutionally decreed and to formulate exceptions 
which we think, for practical reasons, Congress might have made had it thought more about the 
problem.”). 
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wrongful action or holding individual actors liable, but to determine that a 
secrecy privilege should be forfeited because strong normative 
justifications warrant exposure of the underlying information.
344
 It also 
provides a starting point for conceptualizing the quantum of proof courts 
might require when identifying illegal secrets. 
For example, in Clark v. United States, the Supreme Court case 
recognizing the crime-fraud exception,
345
 the Court noted that mere 
allegations of wrongdoing alone would not justify an exception to the 
privilege. The Court stated that to break the “seal of secrecy” requires 
“prima facie evidence” demonstrating that the alleged crime or fraud “has 
some foundation in fact.”346  
In this way, the crime-fraud exception provides a helpful antidote to the 
argument that FOIA litigation is an inappropriate vehicle for testing the 
legality of government information and would open the door to disclosure 
of a wide range of legitimate secrets based upon mere allegations of 
unlawful conduct. Similar to courts’ evaluations of privilege disputes, 
whether government withholdings constitute illegal secrets would not 
compel a trial within a trial on the question of illegality, nor would such 
inquiries supplant Bivens
347
 actions and other vehicles for adjudicating the 
legality of Executive conduct. Rather, under the framework proposed here, 
when determining whether a FOIA exemption applies, courts would not 
declare executive conduct illegal but simply consider whether colorable 
evidence of illegality warrants exposure of the secret to the public based 
upon evidence provided by the government about the secret and that in the 
public record.
348
   
In the end, resistance to considering the lawfulness of government 
action in FOIA disputes is likely less about the workability of such 
 
 
 344. See Clark, 289 U.S. at 14.  
 345. Glynn, supra note 342, at 113. 
 346. Clark, 289 U.S. at 15 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 347. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971) (recognizing a federal cause of action for federal officers’ violation of constitutional rights).  
 348. Since the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in 
Vaughn v. Rosen, when the government seeks to withhold information under FOIA, it must disclose to 
the FOIA requester the basis for the withholding and a description of the information withheld. See 
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826–28 (D.C. Cir. 1973). FOIA applicants could therefore make their 
case for disclosure of illegal secrets based upon the contents of the government’s Vaughn declaration 
and other publicly available information relevant to illegality. See Jaffer, supra note 24, at 460–61. 
Jaffer contends that “some of the government’s most vigorously defended secrets are not really secrets 
at all” but are instead “open secret[s]” or “known unknown[s].” Id. He notes that the government 
frequently tries to conceal information that is already public, whether leaked by whistleblowers, 
uncovered by investigative reporters, or released by government officials speaking to the press both on 
and off the record. Id. at 461. 
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inquiries and instead part of a larger pattern of judicial abdication over 
government “legality” questions more broadly. Indeed, outside of the 
information-disclosure context, in direct challenges to government action, 
courts have exhibited a similar hesitancy to consider the lawfulness of 
controversial and legally suspect national security policies, such as 
extraordinary rendition and the targeted killing of U.S. citizens through 
unmanned drone strikes abroad. Courts have instead relied upon a variety 
of rationales, many purportedly grounded in separation of powers 
principles, to avoid assessing the lawfulness of Executive actions.
349
  
Scholars have persuasively criticized the courts’ failure to resolve 
national security controversies implicating important substantive rights.
350
 
But even assuming the appropriateness of judicial deference or avoidance 
of legality determinations in those direct challenges to government action, 
such deference has little place under FOIA where Congress has mandated 
judicial review as a deliberate check on the Executive and contemplated 
the two branches working together to expose executive wrongdoing.
351
  
Moreover, Congress has made clear through amendments to FOIA that 
it intends for the judicial role in evaluating government secrecy to be 
active and meaningful.
352
 Indeed, as Meredith Fuchs has noted, de novo 
review under FOIA is different from the Chevron deference typically 
afforded to agencies or the “arbitrary and capricious” standard applicable 
 
 
 349. See, e.g., Al–Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding challenge to the 
targeted killing of U.S. citizen abroad was not justiciable in part under the political question doctrine); 
Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that special factors counseled against 
recognizing constitutional claim under Bivens for Canadian man who alleged the United States 
rendered him to Syria for purpose of torture and interrogation); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 
296, 303–04 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing case on the basis of the state secrets privilege after 
recognizing doctrine’s constitutional dimension in light of Executive’s exclusive role over military and 
foreign affairs). 
 350. See, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1013 (2008) (arguing that in addressing “war on terror” controversies, the judiciary has avoided 
important substantive questions bearing upon individual rights and instead focused upon process); see 
also Eileen Kaufman, Deference or Abdication: A Comparison of the Supreme Courts of Israel and the 
United States in Cases Involving Real or Perceived Threats to National Security, 12 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 95 (2013). But see Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security 
Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827 (2013) 
(arguing that courts play an important role in shaping national security policy, even though they rarely 
intervene to substantively resolve a dispute).  
 351. See Samaha, supra note 191, at 938–39 (describing FOIA amendments following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in EPA v. Mink, and noting “Congress was enlisting the judiciary’s help in 
checking executive control over classified information”). 
 352. H.R. REP. NO. 93-876, at 127 (1974) (“increasing the authority of the courts to engage in a 
full review of agency action” with respect to classified information, signaling its intent that courts 
“examine the contents of the records themselves”); 120 CONG. REC. H10864–75 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 
1974); 120 CONG. REC. S19806–23 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974) (overriding Presidential veto of the 1974 
FOIA amendments).  
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under the Administrative Procedures Act.
353
 This starkly contrasts with 
vehicles for challenging executive legality like Bivens actions, which, 
because they are not congressionally authorized, seek to cabin the judicial 
role in checking the Executive.
354
 
Finally, one might argue that acknowledgment of potentially 
superseding national security interests within the illegal secrets framework 
outlined here exposes the approach to the very same dilemma of current 
law—whereby courts defer nearly wholesale to executive secrecy claims. 
Indeed, much has been written about the government’s tendency to exploit 
national security claims in order to conceal information beyond its 
legitimate security interests, including misconduct and illegality.
355
 
Government claims about the dangers of exposing national security secrets 
are often exaggerated or even groundless, as demonstrated by several high 
profile secrecy disputes, including the Pentagon Papers case and the very 
case first recognizing the state secrets privilege.
356
 At the same time, there 
is, of course, a critical need to protect the nation’s legitimate security 
interests.  
To better respond to this persistent dilemma, courts must first 
recognize their responsibility for oversight over illegal secrets in light of 
FOIA’s First Amendment underpinnings and the judiciary’s designated 
role in a process by which two coordinate branches of government 
cooperate to check wrongful conduct by the Executive. Heightened 
engagement with illegal secrets will not alone solve the challenges of 
balancing national security interests with the need for democratic 
transparency. But viewing government illegality as irrelevant to 
government secrecy privileges (as courts currently do) guarantees that the 
balance will be struck in favor of greater secrecy than is required, given 
the demonstrated tendency of government officials to shield their wrongful 
conduct under spurious secrecy pretenses. Once courts accept 
responsibility for checking illegal secrets in lieu of reflexive deference to 
the Executive, they might better negotiate government arguments about 
national security priorities with a healthy amount of skepticism.  
 
 
 353. Fuchs, supra note 108, at 162. 
 354. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 573 (“When the Bivens cause of action was created in 1971, the 
Supreme Court explained that such a remedy could be afforded because that ‘case involve[d] no 
special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’”) (quoting 
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396). 
 355. See supra note 168.  
 356. See supra notes 168 & 233. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1168 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:1099 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Examining the long relationship between secrecy and illegality, one 
can easily lament history repeating itself. In light of the lessons about 
secrecy that the nation appeared to learn after Watergate and the abusive 
intelligence gathering period of the Twentieth Century, it is troubling that, 
when faced with some of the most contentious and legally questionable 
government policies of the current time, the law deems the legality of 
executive conduct as irrelevant to the question of whether government 
information should be disclosed. As a result, the Executive can cloak in 
secrecy both the purported legal authority for legally questionable 
counterterrorism policies as well as information related to the efficacy and 
human costs of government action. The unbroken cover of secrecy that 
results presents a vexing challenge for democracy, given that 
understanding how the Executive implements policy is often essential to 
assessing larger questions about the legal authority for such action—the 
very subject that the government also prefers to keep secret. This 
undermines the entire conceit of transparent and accountable government 
that informs First Amendment doctrine and motivates our statutory 
government disclosure regime. It suggests that when citizen checks and 
accountability matter most, the system largely fails. Greater skepticism 
and probing of potentially illegal secrets can begin to reverse this trend. 
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